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DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE
DUTY OF LOYALTY: RACE, GENDER,




Just as the 85,000-ton cruise ships Disney Magic and Disney
Wonder are forced by science to obey the same laws of buoyancy
as Disneyland's significantly smaller Jungle Cruise ships, so is
a corporate board's extraordinary decision to award a $140
million severance package governed by the same corporate law
principles as its everyday decision to authorize a loan. Legal
rules that govern corporate boards, as well as the managers of
day-to-day operations, are resilient, irrespective of context.
When the laws of buoyancy are followed, the Disney Magic can
stay afloat as well as the Jungle Cruise vessels. When the
Delaware General Corporation Law is followed, a large
severance package is just as valid as an authorization to borrow.
Nature does not sink a ship merely because of its size, and
neither do courts overrule a board's decision to approve and
later honor a severance package, merely because of its size.1
So begins the judicial response to the legal controversy
generated by the saga of Michael Ovitz's short but lucrative
tenure as president of the Walt Disney Company ("Disney"). The
story of that saga is simple enough to relate, though the
Copyright © 2005 by Larry Cati Backer.
f Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law.
The author may be contacted at lcbll@psu.edu. My thanks to Gregory Alvarez (Penn
State '06), Frank Laquanti (Penn State '06), Aaron Acker (Penn State '07), Jill
Hammill (Penn State '07), Katie Maxwell ('07), and Niva Lind ('07) for their
excellent research assistance.
1 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350 (Del. Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), cited
with approval in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs.,
Inc. v. Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,
2004).
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conclusions-especially the legal conclusions-to be drawn from
it have been anything but simple.2 In 1995, Michael Ovitz, then
the head of Creative Artists Agency ("CAA"), 3 was induced by his
friend Michael Eisner, Chairman of the Board of Directors and
CEO of Disney, to accept employment as the new president of
Disney.4 The terms of Ovitz's engagement as president of Disney
were memorialized in an employment agreement effective
October 1, 1995, 5 and ultimately approved by the Disney board in
1995 ("the Employment Agreement").6 As unanimously approved
by the Disney board, 7 the Employment Agreement was to run for
an initial term of five years.8 It provided for a base annual salary
of $1 million, a discretionary bonus, and two sets of stock options
entitling Ovitz to purchase five million shares of Disney stock.9
The Employment Agreement also contained a complicated set of
termination provisions.10 Should Disney refuse to renew the
Employment Agreement after the expiration of its initial term,
Disney was obligated to pay Ovitz a termination fee of $10
million.11 Should Disney terminate the Employment Agreement
for good cause, 12 Ovitz would receive nothing from the day of
2 The narrative that follows is taken from In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 731 A.2d at 350-53 and Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249-53 (Del. 2000).
3 He was "referred to by some as the 'Most Powerful Man in Hollywood."' In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 350.
4 See id. at 352.
5 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004). The employment agreement was apparently
negotiated between September and December 1995, though Ovitz started as
president on or about October 1, 1995. Id. at *1-2.
6 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 250-51 (noting that some initial board disapproval existed
regarding Eisner's decision to hire Ovitz, even though the board's final vote
approving his employment appeared to be unanimous).
7 Id. at 251. The Board of Directors of Disney in 1995 consisted of the following
people: Michael D. Eisner, Roy E. Disney, Stanley P. Gold, Sanford M. Litvack,
Richard A. Nunis, Sidney Poitier, Irwin E. Russell, Robert A.M. Stern, E. Cardon
Walker, Raymond L. Watson, Gary L. Wilson, Reveta F. Bowers, Ignacio E. Lozano
Jr., Stephen F. Bollenbach, and George J. Mitchell. Id. at 252 n.il.
8 Id. at 250.
9 Id. One set of options was to vest in the last three years of the term of Ovitz's
employment agreement ("the Employment Agreement"), and the other was to vest
thereafter, assuming that the term of the employment agreement was extended
beyond its initial five-year term. Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Disney could invoke good cause termination only if Ovitz voluntarily resigned
or otherwise committed gross negligence or malfeasance. Id.
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termination.13 In addition, if Disney were to terminate Ovitz
without good cause, Ovitz would be entitled to a very large
severance fee. 14
Ovitz's tenure at Disney was apparently not a great success.
By September 1996, Ovitz was alleged to have signaled to Eisner
a desire to seek other employment, however Ovitz did not want to
resign.'5 Instead, after some discussion with Eisner, Ovitz and
the Disney board agreed to treat Ovitz's departure as a "non-
fault termination."' 6 This was memorialized in a letter dated
December 27, 1996 (the "Termination Letter").' 7 By 2004 it was
still not clear to the Delaware courts whether the Termination
Letter had been approved by the board or the members thereof.'8
As a consequence, Ovitz lost the right to the option to purchase
two million shares of Disney stock but instead received
approximately $39 million in cash and the right to exercise the
option to purchase three million shares. 19
Legal challenges to the validity of the Employment
Agreement and the Termination Letter followed with a
derivative action filed in January 1997, within days of the
execution of the Termination Letter.20 The litigation continued
through 2005 when the lawsuit finally appeared ready for
13 Id.
14 Id. The severance fee would be equal to the present value of any remaining
salary payments through September 30, 2000, a $10 million severance payment, a
payment of $7.5 million for each fiscal year remaining under the employment
agreement, and the immediate vesting of three million share options. Id.
15 Id. at 252.
16 Id.
17 Id. The board of Disney that existed at the time the termination letter was
written in 1996 consisted of the same individuals that were on the board of Disney
at the time the employment agreement was approved in 1995, excluding board
member Stephen F. Bollenbach. The new board also included new members Leo J.
O'Donovan and Thomas S. Murphy. Id. at 252 n.l1.
18 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2004 WL
2050138, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004). It appears that as late as November 1996,
the Board of Directors had nominated Ovitz for an additional three-year term as
director of Disney. Id. "Furthermore, it is unclear from the record whether a
majority of any group of disinterested directors ever authorized the payment of
Ovitz's severance payments." Id. at *7.
19 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 252-53. The initial complaint valued these options at
about $101 million. Id.
20 See id. at 248 n. 1 (stating that the original complaint was filed on January 8,
1997, and an amended complaint, the subject of the action by the court of chancery,
was filed on May 28, 1997).
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resolution. 21 Trial commenced in October 200422 and continued
into 2005. The decision of Chancellor Chandler ("the
Chancellor"), rejecting all of plaintiffs' remaining claims of
breach of fiduciary duty and waste, was issued on August 9,
2005.23
From the inception of the litigation, the parties focused on
two related actions of the Disney Board of Directors: first,
whether the members of the 1995 Disney Board of Directors were
personally liable for their roles in the approval of the
Employment Agreement, and second, whether the members of
the 1996 Disney Board of Directors were personally liable for
their role--or for their failure to act-in approving the
Termination Letter. 24 By the time the case was tried in 2004-
2005, the principle issues centered on the breach of the 1995
Disney board's duty of care in approving the Employment
Agreement and the validity of the determination by officers and
some directors to pay Ovitz under the Termination Letter in
1996.25
Thus framed, this litigation has been and will continue to be
of interest to academics 26 and the bar 27 primarily for how it
speaks to the limits of executive compensation under Delaware
corporate law. 28 The cases have also been influential, at least in
21 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL
407220 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2005).
22 See Greg Levine, Eisner: Trial Begins Re Disney's Ovitz Compensation,
FORBES.COM, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2004/10/20/
1020autofacescan06.html.
23 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 1875804, at *1.
24 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248-49.
25 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 1875804, at *1.
26 See generally Harvey L. Pitt, The Changing Standards by Which Directors
Will Be Judged, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2005) (reviewing the Disney litigation
in light of the prevalent issue of executive compensation in corporate America);
Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 274 (2000) (examining the Disney cases as
they relate to the growing problems with executive compensation in an "era of
performance-based pay").
27 See generally E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate
Culture, 59 Bus. LAW. 1447 (2004) (discussing the duty of corporate directors to act
in good faith when making business decisions and the recent Disney litigation as it
relates to this obligation).
28 See Jonathan D. Glater, Big Bucks May Stop Here, Ordeal of Disney's Board
Could Herald Changes in Pay Perks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at CI ('"The very
fact that it went to trial had a significant impact on the types of conversations in
general on compensation committees, and in particular about severance plans."'
1014 [Vol.79:1011
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the academy, for what they have to say about shareholder
demand in derivative litigation 29 and the limited value of
allegations of breaches of "good faith" in breach of fiduciary duty
cases.
30
Virtually overlooked in the analysis-and in the commentary
that followed this sprawling Hollywood movie-style melodrama of
corporate governance-was a brief, though intense, effort early in
the litigation to demonstrate demand futility l by alleging that
the Disney Board of Directors was not independent.
3 2  In
particular, the plaintiffs initially argued that demand on the
board was excused with respect to the 1995 approval of the
Employment Agreement and the approval of the 1996
Termination Letter because the board was unable to exercise
business judgment independent of Michael Eisner since he was
personally interested in obtaining approval of both, and he
dominated a majority of the board of directors throughout this
period.3 3 The Delaware Court of Chancery produced an extensive
(quoting executive compensation consultant Ira T. Kay)); Laura M. Holson, Ruling
Upholds Disney's Payment in Firing of Ovitz, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at Al
(describing the cautionary impact of the decision on executive compensation issues
for corporations even though the Chancellor Chandler ("the Chancellor") found for
Disney).
29 See Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation:
Section 220 Demands, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1595, 1601 (2005) (commenting that the
2003 Disney case "illustrates a successful use of a Section 220 demand to obtain facts
that could be pleaded to excuse demand in a derivative action").
30 See, e.g., C.G. Hintmann, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the Context of
Directorial Fiduciary Duties and the Future Impact on Corporate Culture, 49 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 571, 589-91 (2005); Veasey, supra note 27, at 1451-54.
31 See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1:
In a derivative action brought by 1 or more shareholders. .. [t]he
complaint shall... allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the
plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort.
Id. Demand may be excused in Delaware when a reasonable doubt is created as to
whether the directors are disinterested and independent and whether the challenged
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
32 This was the issue that occupied some of the attention of the Court of
Chancery of Delaware in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 731 A.2d 342,
354-61 (Del. Ch. 1998) (analyzing plaintiffs' independence claim under the first
prong of Aronson and concluding that the majority of Disney directors acted
independently and free of domination from Eisner), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
33 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 353-55 ("Plaintiffs
concede that they failed to make a demand on the Board... but argue that such
1015
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analysis of the independence of the directors and the basis of any
claim of domination and control by Eisner.34 It determined that
even if "Eisner was interested in the Employment Agreement-
and, again, Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable doubt as to
Eisner's independence-Plaintiffs still come up short; ten of the
fifteen directors who approved the Agreement and eleven of the
sixteen who voted to honor the Agreement were independent."35
This conclusion was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court, but only on the basis of the insufficiency of factual
allegations as to Eisner's interest in Ovitz's Employment
Agreement.36 The supreme court explained that "[b]ecause we
hold that the Complaint fails to create a reasonable doubt that
Eisner was disinterested in the Ovitz Employment Agreement,
we need not reach or comment on the analysis of the Court of
Chancery on the independence of the other directors for this
purpose. ' 37 The supreme court, however, appeared to reach this
result reluctantly. 38 The parties and the case then moved on to
frame the issues for trial on other bases.
This Article takes up one of the aspects of the "interesting
arguments" raised by the parties and confronted by the court of
chancery with respect to the determination of director
independence under Delaware law. The focus here is on the
application of the independent director standard to one
particular director: Reveta Bowers. 39 What makes Ms. Bowers
especially interesting for understanding the normative
underpinnings of the director independence standards of
Delaware law is the very peculiar way in which the court of
demand would have been futile and, therefore, is excused.").
34 Id. at 355-61 (examining each board member with respect to alleged
domination by Eisner).
35 Id. at 361.
36 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258 (Del. 2000) ("Our affirmance of that dismissal is final
and dispositive of the first prong of Aronson.").
37 Id.
38 "Thus, we need not address the very interesting arguments and
recommendations of the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Council of Institutional
Investors." Id. at n.40. "The Council of Institutional Investors is an organization oflarge public, labor and corporate pension funds which seeks to address investmentissues that affect the size or security of plan assets. Its objectives are to encourage
member funds, as major shareholders, to take an active role in protecting plan
assets and to help members increase return on their investments as part of theirfiduciary obligations." COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, ABOUT THE COUNCIL,
available at http://www.cii.org/aboutl (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
39 See discussion infra Part II.
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chancery sought to apply that standard to her. Though she has
attracted little attention among legal academics, 40 I argue here
that Ms. Bowers illustrates the difficulties of director
independence determinations, especially where seemingly
neutral and efficiency-oriented corporate law principles are used
to reinforce questionable social assumptions of race, gender, and
class.
Neither the parties to the litigation nor the chancery court
itself avoided the temptation to construct Ms. Bowers as a
peculiar sort of director to whom the application of the
independence rules of Delaware corporate law operated in a
singular way. The plaintiffs sought to prove Bowers' domination
by arguing that her economic and social position clearly
suggested an inability to act independently. "Director Reveta F.
Bowers is the principal of the elementary school that Eisner's
children once attended. Plaintiffs suggest that because Bowers'
salary as a teacher is low compared to her director's fees and
stock options, 'only the most rigidly formalistic or myopic
analysis' would view Bowers as not beholden to Eisner."
41
The chancery court first rejected this argument on legal
grounds. It asserted that "[p]laintiffs fail to recognize that the
Delaware Supreme Court has held that 'such allegations [of
payment of director's fees], without more, do not establish any
financial interest.' To follow Plaintiffs' urging to discard
'formalistic notions of interest and independence in favor of a
realistic approach' expressly would be to overrule the Delaware
Supreme Court.' 42
A far more interesting concept, and the principal object of
this Article, was the alternative basis for the chancery court's
40 See SUSAN ESTRICH, SEX AND POWER 86-89 (2000) (describing Bowers'
experience and its utility to the performance of the Disney board); Harvey Gelb,
Corporate Governance Guidelines-A Delaware Response, 1 WYO. L. REV. 523, 545
(2001) (noting position taken by Council of Institutional Investors in its amicus brief
as to Bowers and her relationship to Eisner).
41 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998),
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
(citations omitted).
42 Id. at 360 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) ("Plaintiffs
plead no facts demonstrating a financial interest on the part of GM's directors. The
only averment permitting such an inference is the allegation that all GM's directors
are paid for their services as directors. However, such allegations, without more, do
not establish any financial interest."), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
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conclusion:
Furthermore, to do so would be to discourage the membership
on corporate boards of people of less-than extraordinary means.
Such "regular folks" would face allegations of being dominated
by other board members, merely because of the relatively
substantial compensation provided by the board membership
compared to their outside salaries. I am especially unwilling to
facilitate such a result. Without more, Plaintiffs have failed to
allege facts that lead to a reasonable doubt as to the
independence of Bowers.4 3
What makes this rationale extraordinary is the breadth and
depth of meanings, contradictions, and socio-cultural
assumptions packed so tightly within such a small space.
Moreover, the chancery court refused to confront directly the
issue raised by plaintiffs: that the great gulf in wealth, status,
and position between Bowers' primary occupational and social
status-working as the principal of a primary school servicing
the children of the very rich-and that of a director of Disney-
suggesting that the norm for the occupation of such status
required great wealth, status, or position in society-necessarily
made Bowers dependent on those who held the keys to the
continuation of her role in the socially and economically superior
position as a Disney director.44 To maintain that position,
plaintiffs suggested that Bowers would reasonably do anything to
please Eisner, the person who made holding that position
possible. 45 Instead, the chancery court effectively suggested that
were plaintiffs' argument to be seriously considered, then
"regular folks" would never be able to serve on a board of
directors of corporations like Disney.46 Since that could not
possibly be the public policy underlying the director
independence rules of Delaware corporate law, some sort of
presumption against application of the director independence
rules would have to apply when "regular people" are placed in
positions of authority well beyond what would ordinarily be
expected of people of their social and economic status.47
This rationale is extraordinary not only for what it seems to
43 Id.
44 Id. at 359-60.
45 Id. at 359.
46 Id. at 360.
47 Id.
1018 [Vol.79:1011
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suggest but also for what it implies but does not say. Having
painted a picture of a school teacher of humble means, the
chancery court's opinion then offers an approach that stresses
the importance of class in the application of what had otherwise
been a class-neutral analysis of independence. 48 But the real
picture the court paints is significantly different, in critical
respects, from that which the chancery court painted with so
broad a brush. This school teacher-this African-American
woman-is also the wife of a judge and mother of a Disney
employee. 49 The analysis thus starkly evidences the way in
which stereotype plays a substantial role in the development of
facts-especially, it would seem, facts about racial minorities and
people of purportedly humble economic status. Moreover, the
analysis reveals how culturally crafted notions of reality affect
the application of legal standards to these "facts." Just as courts
used narrative to construct "ideal types" in the law to which
"ideal standards" are applied in the regulation of sexual
conduct,50 so too have courts constructed "ideal types" against
which social and cultural assumptions can be played out through
an application of generally applicable legal standards.
51
Part I starts with a brief description of the general standard
applied when courts seek to determine the independence of
directors and the application of that standard in the chancery
court's assessments of the directors' ties to Eisner. What the
Chancellor applies-and what traditional Delaware corporate
48 Id.
49 California Community Foundation, Reveta Bowers, http://www.calfund.org/
3/governors_3.4_bowers.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
50 See Larry Catd Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional
Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and
British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529, 531 (1996) [hereinafter Backer, Constructing a
"Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory] ("This Article explores the ways in which
courts create images-archetypes--of sexual nonconformists to resist legal
challenges to the regulation of sexual conduct through the criminal law."); Larry
Cati Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial Transmogrification of
Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 611, 641 (1998) [hereinafter Backer, Tweaking Facts] ("Judicial
stories are derived from and confirm popular understandings of the sexual non-
conformist .... [which in turn] shapes jurisprudential catechisms.").
51 For an argument that Delaware courts employ opinions to tell stories and a
discussion of the importance of those stories to the application of the law by future
courts, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) ("[We come much closer to
understanding the role of courts in corporate law if we think of judges more as
preachers than as policemen.").
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jurisprudence produces-is a narrow and segmented analysis
that creates artificial types against which to apply legal
standards. The results are idiosyncratic at best, cynically
manipulative at worst-and always capable of tremendous
"elasticity" in application.
Part II first unpacks the narrative of Reveta Bowers and
adds layers of complexity to the picture painted by the chancery
court. It then returns to the legal standard in the context of the
richer picture painted. It does so based on the arguments urged
by plaintiffs and ignored by the chancery court: applying a
"realist" rather than "formalist" interest analysis in order tojudge the nature of the relationship between Bowers and
Eisner. 52 Such an analysis paints a truer picture of the litigant
and liberates her from the status of fetish object of formalist
stereotype. It also makes for a more dynamic and fairer
assessment of independence. Ironically, in the case of Ms.
Bowers, the application of a more realistic approach might better
support a determination that she was independent than does the
retreat to sloganeering provided by the chancery court.
The more realistic approach that plaintiffs urged on the
Chancellor comes closer to providing a fair basis of assessment of
independence. This approach begins to incorporate more
effectively what Feminist and Critical Race theorists have been
urging for some time-the importance of relational analysis in
fact-dependent legal analysis in order to expose and give
appropriate significance to all aspects realistically touching on
actions or transactions subject to legal regulation. 53 Critical Race
and Feminist theorizing offer a method of avoiding the
arbitrariness and stereotypes of a bare formalist assessment by
supplementing economic and financial understanding with a
relational analysis grounded in an analysis of the power
relationships between actors. A generation of Critical Race,
Feminist, and outsider scholarship has already provided a
foundation for a subordination analysis based on an acceptance
of the assumption that race, gender, ethnicity, sexual preference,
52 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
53 See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed.
2003); CROSS ROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco
Valdes et al. eds., 2002); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimber6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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and perceived class status matter.54  Even conservatives
recognize the way the construction of any culturally significant
difference can affect law and legal structure. 55 A subordination
based relational analysis has significant utility in fact-sensitive
determinations, such as director independence. It serves to
expose the subtle ways in which class, gender, and race affect the
application of standards in fact-driven contexts-like
determinations of director independence-and may help courts
and litigants strive for fairer and more realistic results.
Subordination based relational analysis also highlights the
great tension in current Delaware jurisprudence about director
independence-between a broad definition of independence and a
narrow one. A lot is at stake. Director independence is
increasingly the gateway through which much corporate action
must pass. Demand futility for shareholder derivative
litigation,56  application of the business judgment rule,
5 7
determinations about executive compensation,
58  conflict of
interest transactions, 59 termination of shareholder derivative
litigation,60 and uninvited takeover bids6 1 are grounded in rules
of judicial deference to decisions of independent members of the
board of directors. Capital markets have embraced the notion.
62
54 Several collections of some of the foundational work in the legal academy on
Critical Race Theory have now been published. See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002); CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
55 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 7 (1992) (stating that one of
the author's aims in writing his book was to "demonstrate the inadequacy of
conventional legal and moral reasoning in dealing with complex, emotion-laden
social phenomena such as sexuality").
56 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) and its progeny.
57 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971).
58 See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336-38 (Del. Ch. 1997); Steiner v.
Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995). But
see Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 161-62
(1996).
59 See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14-15 (Del. Ch. 2002).
60 See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922 (1979).
61 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
62 "Effective boards of directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out
their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the
quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of
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Federal regulation has increasingly turned to it as a foundation
for governance.6 3  Corporations have increasingly found the
independent director a useful vehicle for effecting corporate
business without shareholder interference. The broader the
definition of independence, the easier it is for the corporation to
amass directors to serve in that role. The Delaware courts have
tended to craft a broad standard for determining independence
based on a difficult to overcome presumption of independence
and a rejection of the importance of non-economic relationships.64
This has generated some criticism, especially after the corporate
scandals of the early 21st century, 65 even by members of the
Delaware judiciary.66
This Article adds to the criticism of the Delaware approach
to independence analysis by suggesting that, beyond the
psychology of independence,67 other critical factors, often
overlooked, also play a role that ought to be recognized in
crafting an analytical standard for determining independence. A
subordination based relational analysis of the type suggested
here may make it more difficult for a corporation to produce an
"independent" board. But that may not be a bad thing. The
object of independence should not be to provide an easy vehicle to
interest." N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual, Rule 303A.01 (Independent Directors),Commentary, available at http://www.nyse.comlFrameset.html?displayPagenl/cm/
107841 6 930882.html?archive=no.
63 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat.
745.
64 Thus for example, the Aronson court explained early on that "[t]he
requirement of director independence inhers in the conception and rationale of thebusiness judgment rule. The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise ofbusiness judgment is based in part on this unyielding precept." Aronson v. Lewis,473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984). See also Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland
Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959, 977-78 (Ohio 1986).
65 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232-33 (2002);Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 961-66 (1996).66 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the
Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371 (2002). ViceChancellor Strine was the author of the chancery court opinion in In re Oracle Corp.Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003), appeal denied, Oracle Corp. ex
rel. Special Litig. Comm. v. Barone, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003), summary judgmentgranted, In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872A.2d 960 (Del. 2005), discussed infra at notes 100-02.
67 See James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 98-99 (1985).
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authenticate board action. It should erect a higher wall between
personal interest or obligation and corporate control.
In place of the current Delaware analysis, and in lieu of the
structural bias analysis rejected by Delaware courts,
68 this
Article then suggests an alternative approach to the
determination of director independence. The touchstone of this
approach should be subordination. Subordination would
encompass all hierarchical and affective relationships.
Subordination should serve as a substantive rule-subordination
destroys all claims of independence. Subordination should also
serve as a procedural rule-establishment of a relationship of
subordination ought to shift the burden of proving independence
from the plaintiff to the director seeking to establish
independence for purposes of validating board of directors'
actions. The point of subordination analysis is to unmask the
relationship of power, not to hide it through the creation of
artificial barriers to uncovering the nature of dependence in
relationships between people. The Article ends by assessing the
utility of the proposed subordination-relational standard.
Application of the standard to the facts of the Disney litigation
demonstrates the ways in which the alternative standard yields
different results. Had the chancery court applied a
subordination based relational standard it would have been far
more likely that a greater number of directors might have been
found not to be independent.
This Article does not mean to suggest that the law of director
independence is a rush to judgment-for example, that it is
"racist" or "gender biased" or "class driven." Those types of
sloganeering conclusions are not particularly helpful in this
context. The point is that Critical Race and Feminist Theories
have something important to add to any discussion of fiduciary
duty and director independence: that relationships matter and
that analysis that does little to unearth relationships of power,
race, gender, and social status will produce results with very
little relation to the facts purportedly considered by a court. This
Article focuses on a concrete application of a conundrum with
which legal theory has been wrestling since the middle of the last
century-the significance that ought to be accorded to differences
68 See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004), discussed infra at notes 101-02.
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that retain cultural significance.69
The Chancellor's analysis, taken in the aggregate, begins to
suggest the application of a set of presumptions with significantlegal effect. These presumptions are not those the Chancellor
sought to avoid-that is, presumptions relating to the
consequences of particular economic and non-economic
relationships between directors-but other, perhaps moreproblematic presumptions. These presumptions about the
consequences of gender, race, and class for dependence should bequite troublesome. A consciousness of the subtle ways in which
class, gender, and race affect the application of standards in fact-driven contexts, like determinations of director independence,
may help courts and litigants strive for fairer and more realistic
results. Reveta Bowers illustrates the way race, gender, and
class can affect even the most neutral, economic-efficiency,policy-based provisions of corporate law. Substituting a
subordination based relational analysis may increase thelikelihood that more directors will not be able to showindependence in a conflict of interest situation. But that result
will strengthen the corporation: it can deepen the legitimacy ofindependent board of director decisions; it can broaden the
application of principles of shareholder democracy for otherdecisions and reduce second guessing by courts in protected
litigation.
I. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF DOMINATION AND CONTROL
AND THE DISNEY LITIGATION
A. A Brief Reminder of the Importance of Interest and
Independence in Assessing Executive Compensation and
Director Loyalty
Executive compensation has long been an object of
controversy, usually pitting directors and officers againstindividual shareholders. Since the middle of the last century, theAmerican courts have refused to referee the battles over specific
compensation schemes.70 For several generations, American
69 For a discussion on the dynamics of cultural significance in political and
social ordering, especially as it concerns issues of race, see Larry Catd Backer,Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society, and Racial Equity, 21 U. ARK.LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845 (1999).70 See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590 (1933) (upholding bonuses paid to
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courts have embraced the idea that "[c]ourts are ill-equipped to
solve or even grapple with these entangled economic
problems .... Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly
and fairly operated by its directors... but what is reasonable
compensation for its officers is primarily for the stockholders."
71
But courts were willing to construct a judicial limit even to
shareholder action. Shareholder action may be defeated, at "the
protest of a shareholder, [if] used to justify payments of sums as
salaries so large in substance and effect to amount to spoliation
or waste of corporate property."72  By the 1990s, at least in
Delaware, executive compensation could be successfully
challenged only if there was no "rational basis for directors to
conclude that the amount and form of compensation is
appropriate."73 As a consequence, even when a court declined an
invitation to dismiss a suit alleging waste in granting executive
compensation, the great concern of state courts was the
prevention of action that could constitute "an undue
encouragement to strike suits." 74  The waste standard thus
serves as a high barrier indeed to attacks on executive
compensation schemes on substantive grounds.
Federal law has provided additional protection. Federal
income tax rules have capped the amount of compensation that
may be deducted by public corporations,
75 but the tax rules have
not proven very effective in limiting the size of compensation
packages of senior executives at public companies.
76 Federal
securities laws provide additional protection, but the protection
is effectively limited to disclosure. Federal disclosure rules, for
example, focus on full disclosure of compensation,
77 but do not
executives of American Tobacco Company pursuant to a shareholder-approved bylaw
adopted in 1912 absent proof of waste).
71 Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941), affd mem., 263
App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 131 (1st Dep't 1941).
72 Rogers, 289 U.S. at 591.
73 Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *8 (Del. Ch. July
19, 1995).
74 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 339 (Del. Ch. 1997).
75 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000). Thus, Ovitz's employment agreement was careful to
specify a salary of $1 million. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76 See Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive
Compensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489 (1998); Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap
Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying To Control Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673 (2004).
77 See, e.g., Item 402, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2005); Schedule 14A,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2005) (requiring the provision of the information required
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purport to regulate the substance of the compensation put for
approval to the shareholders or otherwise approved by adisinterested board of directors. Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 did little to supplement state law regulation of the
substance of executive compensation schemes.78 These federal
regulatory incursions have been criticized as being too limited to
be effective.79
Courts have been more willing to entertain attacks on
executive compensation when litigants assert a conflict ofinterest in approving such compensation.8 c The essence of this
sort of interest analysis is the assertion that a corporate officer ordirector has misused power over the corporation in order tobenefit himself rather than to advance the corporation.8' It hasbeen observed, however, that self-interest is not always present
when the duty of loyalty has been breached.82 Regardless of thedirector's motives or intentions, the 'director who consciouslydisregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may
suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any harmhe causes"' when he uses the corporation to advance himself or
others.8 3 "[W]here self-interest is or could be present, merely
examining the substantive and procedural fairness of a self-interested transaction is insufficient."84 In order for a director tobe loyal, he or she must do more than guard against betraying orharming the corporation's interests; the director must act in a
way that affirmatively furthers the corporation's interests.5 TheAmerican Law Institute supports this principle and emphasizes
the need to advance affirmatively the corporation's interest, in
addition to pointing out that promoting the interest of a third
by Item 402, Regulation S-K in connection with the election of directors and the
approval of compensation schemes).78 The principal addition was a limitation of corporate personal loans to
executives. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2000).
79 For a criticism of both traditional state governance rules in general and thecurrent framework for federal regulation, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance
of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
317 (2004).
80 See Dexsil Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1998); Rapco, Inc. v.Comm'r, 85 F.3d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1996).
81 See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse inCorporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 34 (2003).
82 See id. at 36.
83 Id. (citing Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
84 Id. at 41.
85 Id.
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party ahead of the corporation is the equivalent of a director
furthering his own interests.
8 6
But, it is usually difficult to show that a majority of directors
had a direct interest in board approval of executive
compensation, and such a showing is necessary to rebut
successfully the presumptions of the business judgment rule and
permit judicial application of the entire fairness standard.
8 7 To
succeed in a claim, a litigant would have to prove that a
"majority of the director defendants have a financial interest in
the transaction or were dominated or controlled by a materially
interested director."88  Director conflict of interest and
independence are sometimes tested in the context of demand
futility.8 9 Either way, the courts apply the same analysis. As the
court in Brehm v. Eisner90 emphasized, at least one interested
director is necessary to succeed on a claim, but a plaintiff will
have to show that a majority of directors were interested or
subject to the control of the interested director to succeed on a
claim of breach of duty (or demand futility):
Not all instances in which management stands on both sides of
a corporate transaction trigger loyalty review. Even when
management has a conflicting interest in a transaction, a
board's motives can be seen as mixed or ambiguous if the
transaction also offers special or unique value to the corporation
because it is not available on the open market. Executive
compensation, transactions between corporations with
interlocking directorates, dismissal of derivative litigation, and
corporate actions taken in the control context (such as takeover
defenses) are examples of these transactions. In these cases,
courts do not assume self-interested influence, and full-fledged
loyalty review normally does not apply. Only if self-interest is
proved-that is, only if a challenger shows that the interested
person dominated or controlled the decision-making process-do
86 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. q (1959), which
states that it is improper for a trustee to act to benefit a third 
party rather than the
trust estate).
87 See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995).
When allegations of failure to disclose are made, it may not 
be necessary to
demonstrate that a majority of the board was tainted by interest conflicts or lack 
of
independence. See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22-23 (Del. Ch. 2002).
88 Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988); see also Cinerama, 663 
A.2d
at 1168.
89 See Radin, supra note 29, at 1602.
90 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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courts undertake a loyalty review. 91
The state law standard has long been criticized as virtuallyineffective in policing against managerial overreaching. 92
When directorial independence is put at issue, the Delaware
courts have looked to the transaction at issue and focused on the
nature of the relationship between the interested director and
the dominated director.93 Delaware courts will apply the entirefairness standard only if the plaintiff is able to plead factsdemonstrating that a majority of the board of directors that
approved the transaction was interested or lackedindependence.94 Otherwise the court will "respectj the businessjudgment of the board."95 The determination of independence is
wholly contextual, 96 but when the allegation involves a lack ofindependence, courts have demanded a showing that the person
or group who dominates the board actually has a conflictinginterest in the contested transaction. 97
91 Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director'sDuty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1366 (1989) (footnotes omitted).92 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 766-67 (2002).93 See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1049-50 (Del. 2004).
94 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1084-85 (Del. 2001) (affirming thechancery court's determination that a majority of the board was disinterested uponthe failure of the plaintiff to show that a majority of the board members who
approved the transaction were dominated by the interested director).95 Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002).96 The Delaware courts have been quite mindful of the implications of this
approach:
This contextual approach is a strength of our law, as even the best mindshave yet to devise across-the-board definitions that capture all the
circumstances in which the independence of directors might reasonably bequestioned. By taking into account all circumstances, the Delaware
approach undoubtedly results in some level of indeterminacy, but with the
compensating benefit that independence determinations are tailored to the
precise situation at issue.
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 (Del. Ch. 2003), appealdenied, Oracle Corp. ex rel. Special Litig. Comm. v. Barone, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003),summary judgment granted, In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904 (Del.Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005).
97 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 355 (Del. Ch. 1998),aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000):In order to prove domination and control by Eisner, Plaintiffs mustdemonstrate first that Eisner was personally interested in obtaining theBoard's approval of the Employment Agreement and, second, that amajority of the Board could not exercise business judgment independent ofEisner in deciding whether to approve the Employment Agreement.
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On the separate question of independence, the Aronson Court
stated that "[i]ndependence means that a director's decision is
based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board
rather than extraneous considerations or influences." Such
extraneous considerations or influences may exist when the
challenged director is controlled by another. To raise a question
concerning the independence of a particular board member, a
plaintiff asserting the "control of one or more directors must
allege particularized facts manifesting 'a direction of corporate
conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests
of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.' The
shorthand shibboleth of 'dominated and controlled directors' is
insufficient." This lack of independence can be shown when a
plaintiff pleads facts that establish "that the directors are
'beholden' to [the controlling person] or so under their influence
that their discretion would be sterilized.
9 8
The burden is on the plaintiff to "allege some facts showing a
director is beholden to an interested director in order to show a
lack of independence."99 Those facts need not show a financial or
economic basis for dependence on an interested director. The
"question of independence turns on whether a director is, for any
substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the
best interests of the corporation in mind. That is, [the Supreme
Court cases] ultimately 'focusl on impartiality and
objectivity."' 100 However, the Delaware Supreme Court continues
Id.; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.62(d) (2002) (defining domination as "a
familial, financial, professional, or employment relationship with a second 
director
who does have a conflicting interest respecting the transaction").
98 Orman, 794 A.2d at 24 (footnotes omitted). For a similar statement of the
standard, see Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002):
Theoretically, a director can be "controlled" by another, for purposes of
determining whether the director lacked the independence necessary to
consider the challenged transaction objectively. A controlled director is one
who is dominated by another party, whether through close personal 
or
familial relationship or through force of will. A director may also be deemed
"controlled" if he or she is beholden to the allegedly controlling entity, as
when the entity has the direct or indirect unilateral power to decide
whether the director continues to receive a benefit upon which the director
is so dependent or is of such subjective material importance that its
threatened loss might create a reason to question whether the director 
is
able to consider the corporate merits of the challenged transaction
objectively.
Id. (citation omitted).
99 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. 
v.
Elkins, No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
100 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003),
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to reaffirm "that a showing of structural bias on a board ofdirectors is insufficient to avoid the demand requirement,"101
despite the occasional invitation of the chancery court to revisit
this approach.102 In determining lack of independence, Delaware
courts look to evidence of control. To determine control, courts
sometimes distinguish between directors who lack independencebecause they are dominated by another party and directors who
are beholden to another party with an interest in the
transaction.10 3 Domination can result from close personal or
appeal denied, Oracle Corp. ex rel. Special Litig. Comm. v. Barone, 829 A.2d 141(Del. 2003), summary judgment granted, In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005). The court of chancery
explained:
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature
that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated
notions of the law and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merelyhomo economicus. We may be thankful that an array of other motivations
exist [sic] that influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed
or avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of motives likelove, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct theirbehavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.
Nor should our law ignore the social nature of humans. To be direct,
corporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed in
social institutions. Such institutions have norms, expectations that,
explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the behavior of those who
participate in their operation.
Id. at 938.
i01 Mark J. Loewenstein, Beam v. Stewart: Friendship is Not Enough, 18(6)INSIGHTS 22 (2004) (discussing Beam ex rel. Martha Stewarf Living Omnimedia, Inc.v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004)). Beam reaffirmed the traditional contextual
and factual approach over the presumptive approach of any structural bias analysis.
Id. at 1050-51.
102 See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 (Del. Ch. 2003),
appeal denied, Oracle Corp. ex rel. Special Litig. Comm. v. Barone, 829 A.2d 141(Del. 2003), summary judgment granted, In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), affld, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005). At the time of its decision,
commentators thought that the case broke new ground, substantially broadening thegrounds on which lack of independence could be successfully alleged. See, e.g., MarkJ. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 353,374-375 (2004). For a discussion of structural bias issues, see Julian Velasco,Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821 (2004).However, in Beam, 845 A.2d 1040, the Delaware Supreme Court specificallydistinguished and limited the potentially far-reaching analysis of Vice ChancellorStrine in Oracle. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1054-56 (section entitled "A Word About theOracle Case" distinguishing the analysis involving the independence of ashareholder litigation committee from that of demand futility without deciding
"whether the substantive standard of independence in an SLC case differs from thatin a presuit demand case." Id. at 1055 & n.45).
103 See, e.g., Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264-65; Orman, 794 A.2d at 24, 25 n.50.
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familial relationships or by assertion of strong personal will by
the interested party. 10 4 A director who is beholden to another can
also be controlled. A director is beholden to another "when the
allegedly controlling entity has the unilateral power," be it
directly or indirectly, "to decide whether the challenged director
continues to receive a benefit, financial or otherwise, upon which
the challenged director is so dependent or is of such subjective
material importance to him that the threatened loss of that
benefit" would create a question of that director's
independence. 105
Domination, as such, includes a materiality standard. To
have legal effect in an independence analysis, the benefit must be
significant enough "in the context of the director's economic
circumstances, as to have made it improbable that the director
could perform her fiduciary duties to the ... shareholders
without being influenced by her overriding personal interest."'
0 6
Thus, courts have sometimes appropriated the language of
"board sterilization" to describe a standard for demonstrating
lack of independence: "To establish lack of independence, [the
shareholder] must show that the directors are 'beholden' to the
[more powerful directors] or so under their influence that their
discretion would be sterilized."'1 7 The analysis is meant to be
highly contextual.10 8
104 See Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50.
105 Id.
106 In re Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 1999).
107 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993). See also In re EBAY, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004)
(finding that demand was excused and futility analysis turned on allegations that
compensation to non-interested directors in the form of not-yet-vested stock options
created a reasonable doubt of their independence for pleading purposes).
108 See ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1049-50 (Del. 2004) ("Independence is a fact-specific determination made in
the context of a particular case. The court must make that determination by
answering the inquiries: independent from whom and independent for what
purpose?"). Thus, for example, consider the explanation in support of domination in
an early Delaware case:
It was perfectly evident to me that Odlum dominated and controlled those
members of Airfleets' board who decided to "reject" the offer to purchase the
patents. I use "dominate and control" in the sense that, criminality aside,
his wishes were their commands. My conclusion is drawn from the inter-
play of several circumstances; some tangible and others intangible: The two
directors who voted to reject the offer are both, realistically speaking,
beholden to Odlum; Odlum was and is Airfleets' president and a member of
its board; the manner in which the corporate affairs were handled as
1031
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Courts have considered whether different types of
relationships or interests affect the independence of directors. In
every case, the courts have refused to create either a bright line
rule or a presumption that any sort of relationship to the
interested director without more proves lack of independence.10 9
1. Friendship, Outside Business Relationships, or Approval of
Contested Transactions
"Our cases have determined that personal friendships,
without more; outside business relationships, without more; and
approving of or acquiescing in the challenged transactions,
without more, are each insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of
a director's ability to exercise independent business judgment." 110
Thus, it is not enough to allege only that directors "moved in the
same social circles, attended the same weddings, developed
business relationships before joining the board, and described
each other as 'friends."'""1 However, some friendships, in context,
might raise issues of independence.112
among the board members showed that realistically this was a one-man
board-an Odlum board. Nor is my conclusion affected by the subsequent
director ratification. And I emphasize that my conclusion is based not
merely on the manner in which the various director relationships were
created but on the cumulative effect of the trial record.
Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916, 920 (Del. Ch. 1955), rev'd sub nom. Johnston v.
Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956).
109 See, e.g., Guilfoyle v. Brown, 88 P.2d 1082 (Kan. 1939) (finding no
presumption of domination merely because the interested director could terminate
the employment of the officer directors on the board). The court in this case
expressed the policy thus:
Plaintiff asks us to infer that the board did as Brown desired because the
members of the board were all officers of the company and would have lost
their jobs if they had not done as Brown directed. This is an inference the
trial court was not entitled to draw and one which this court will not draw.
In the first place there is no evidence in this record as to the salary of these
officers and directors or any surrounding circumstances with reference to
them. In the absence of some evidence we will not presume that the
members of the board of directors were so venal as to allow such a
consideration to sway their action and cause them not to do their duty
under the above statutes.
Id. at 1084.
110 Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ.A. 19191, 2002 WL
31888343, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002) (emphasis added).
11 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1051 (Del. 2004).
112 Id. at 1050 ("[Slome professional or personal friendships, which may border
on or even exceed familial loyalty and closeness, may raise a reasonable doubt
whether a director can appropriately consider demand. This is particularly true
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2. Employment and Personal Relationships with the Company or
Interested Directors and Officers
An employment relationship with the company-even one
where the interested director may have the power to terminate
the employment of the director-is not, standing alone, enough to
create a presumption of dependence. 113  In contrast, personal
relationships, or fiduciary relationships are presumptively
suspect.11 4 Delaware courts have applied this rule to determine
that brothers-in-law,1 1 5 grandchildren,1 1 6 and cousins ' 17 might
not be impartial. However, some direct family relationships,
including that between parent and child, might be insufficient to
establish lack of independence.
118
when the allegations raise serious questions of either civil or criminal liability of
such a close friend."). See also supra note 32 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court constructed a "risk of reputation" test for determining when allegations of
friendship could raise questions of independence:
To create a reasonable doubt about an outside director's independence, a
plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because of
the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the
interested director's stock ownership or voting power, the non-interested
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested director.
Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052.
113 See Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002) (reversing a grant of
summary judgment where there was alleged domination of the board since the CEO
was in a position to affect their livelihood); Guilfoyle, 88 P.2d at 1084 (rejecting
plaintiffs inference that members of the board-all officers of the company-did as
the interested director desired because the interested director was the president of
the company and the board members feared they would lose their jobs if they did
not).
114 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996). See MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT, supra note 97, § 8.60(3) (defining "related person") and its application to the
definition of "conflicting interest," MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60(1).
115 Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 889 (Del. Ch. 1999).
116 Mizel v. Connelly, No. Civ.A. 16638, 1999 WL 550369, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2,
1999).
117 Seibert v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., CIV. A. No. 6639, 1984 WL 21874,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec . 5, 1984).
118 The general rule that family relationships can form a basis for lack of
independence, Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216, can be overcome under certain
circumstances. See In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litig., No. Civ.A.
531-N, 2005 WL 1076069 (Del. Ch. April 29, 2005). In that case, Vice Chancellor
Lamb determined that a director could be independent even when the company
employed his son.
Family employment ties can give rise to concerns about the ability of
directors to act independently of a company's management. For example,
the NYSE rules governing director independence focus on this subject,
holding that employment of a child as an executive officer of the
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3. Appointment to the Board
The courts have sometimes refused to read a presumption of
domination where a person owes his appointment to the board
solely on account of the efforts or power of the interested
director.119
[Tihe relevant inquiry is not how the director got his position,
but rather how he comports himself in that position.
Plaintiffs have not pled any facts that demonstrate that the
unnamed directors did not exercise their own independent
business judgment in decision-making or that they merely
submitted to the will of [the majority shareholder]. 120
The Delaware Supreme Court in Beam reaffirmed this rule. 121
corporation may disqualify an outside director from serving as a
disinterested member of the board. Delaware courts also recognize that
familial ties to management can disqualify one from functioning
disinterestedly. In this case, however, Bossidy's son is not an executive
officer of JPMC, and the complaint does not allege that Bossidy and his son
live in the same household. Under NYSE Corporate Governance rules,
Bossidy was found to meet the criteria for certification as an outside,
independent director. Moreover, the fact that Bossidy's son is employed by
JPMC is duly disclosed in JPMC's proxy materials.
Id. at *10.
119 See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845
A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 735 A.2d
386, 407-12 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that the majority shareholder and corporate
creditor did not dominate the board). Vice Chancellor Lamb stated, 'My review of
the record and observation of the character and demeanor of the witnesses at the
trial convinces me that the majority of the board was not dominated or controlled by
Fleming." Id. at 407. But see Stepak v. Dean, No. 6315, 1982 WL 8790, at *1 (Del.
Ch. May 21, 1982) (charging domination of the board by the president in regard to
self-serving transactions when the board consisted of three people: Dean, his
personal representative, and a member that Dean had appointed to the board). The
court explained that "Dean's power was blatantly exemplified when, as allegedherein, Dean manipulated the ascendance of defendant Rawlins to the Pioneer
Board of Directors in order to facilitate the sale of PCM inventory to himself and
then, shortly following the sale, returned himself to the Board." Id. at *2.
120 Andreae v. Andreae, Civ. A. No. 11905, 1992 WL 43924, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar.
3, 1992) (finding that the owner of the voting stock appointed the directors but did
not dominate them). The appointment of directors is not enough to show domination.
Id.
121 "A stockholder's control of a corporation does not excuse presuit demand on
the board without particularized allegations of relationships between the directors
and the controlling stockholder demonstrating that the directors are beholden to the
stockholder." Beam, 845 A.2d at 1054 ("As noted earlier, the relationships alleged by
Beam do not lead to the inference that the directors were beholden to Stewart and,
thus, unable independently to consider demand. Coupling those relationships with
Stewart's overwhelming voting control of MSO does not close that gap.").
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4. Contractual or Philanthropic Relationship with the Company
Courts have determined that a person's contractual
relationship with a company on the board of which they serve
may, but does not necessarily, suggest a lack of independence.
When the contractual relationship is unaffected by the
transaction at issue, the contractual relationship, without more,
may be insufficient to raise an issue of independence.
122 On the
other hand, courts have found a lack of independence when the
fulfillment of the contract or its renewal is dependent on an
interested director, and the contract is material to the director
whose independence is at issue.123 Likewise, "Delaware courts
have previously recognized that philanthropic relationships with
institutions may give rise to questions about a director's
independence. But in those cases, the complaints
had ... particularized facts about the materiality of the
relationship in question that would create a reasonable doubt
about the independence of the directors."
124
5. Serving as Outside Counsel to the Corporation
Courts have found that outside counsel sitting on the board
of directors may be dominated. 125 An Ohio court perhaps put it
best: "Berick [the director in question] was outside counsel for
the [Cleveland] Browns and was, as the trial court found, a
dominated director who did not act independently. Since 'it was
Berick's job to do what [the president] requested,' it is obvious
that he was dominated and controlled by [the president]. 126
The issue of domination has been particularly troublesome
for policymakers. The principal issue with the traditional
standard exemplified by Delaware's approach has been the
perceived uncertainty of the standard, suggesting too much
122 See Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 29-30 (Del. Ch. 2002).
123 See id. at 30.
124 In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Litig., 2005 WL 1076069, at *10
& n.48 (citations omitted).
125 Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 922 (Del. 1956). In Johnston, a business
opportunity was presented to the board. Id. It rejected the proposal and the
president took the opportunity himself. Id. Two directors worked in the law firm
that handled matters for the company, while the other members of the board were
employees of the company and were appointed to the board at the president's
invitation. Id.
126 Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d
959, 968 (Ohio 1986).
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discretion on the part of courts in its application and too little
guidance for directors seeking to comply in good faith with
reasonable rules of good corporate conduct. 27 Under the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act, a more formalistic and narrow
approach to director independence has been created, limited to
certain financial interests. 128
The drafters of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
however, recognized that, outside of the grounds for determining
conflicting interest transactions, "there is a penumbra of director
interests, desires, goals, loyalties, and prejudices that may, in a
particular context, run at odds with the best interests of the
corporation."'129 With respect to those relationships typically the
subject of an independence analysis under Delaware law, the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act suggests that those
types of relationships may produce liability, when challenged, if
the director cannot show a reasonable belief that the transaction
was in the best interests of the corporation.' 30 "This standard is
intended to be easier for the interested director or officer to
satisfy than a pure-fairness standard but harder to satisfy than
the business-judgment standard."131
Yet the Revised Model Business Corporation Act retains a
broad and very flexible standard to determine the independence
of directors who do not fall within the more narrow and
formalistic rules. This flexible standard is particularly important
in the context of approvals of "directors conflicting interest
transactions" by disinterested board members. 32  Such
127 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, supra note 97, § 8.61 official comment.
128 See id. § 8.60.
129 Id. § 8.61 official comment.
130 See id. § 8.31; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS § 502 (1992).
131 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 454 (1993).
Professor Eisenberg suggests:
The intermediate standard of review of self-interested transactions that
have been properly approved by disinterested directors accommodates both
the need to make self-interested transactions reviewable for fairness, on
the one hand, and the value of institutional autonomy and the desirability
of providing self-interested directors and officers with an incentive to seek
early approval from disinterested directors, on the other.
Id.
132 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, supra note 97, § 8.62(a) (providing a safe harbor for
director conflicting interest transactions approved-after appropriate disclosure-by
a majority of qualified directors).
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disinterested or "qualified" directors include only those directors
who do not have a conflicting interest in the transaction and are
independent. The Model Business Corporation Act defines
"independence" as the absence of "a familial, financial,
professional, or employment relationship with a second director
who does have a conflicting interest respecting the transaction,
which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be
expected to exert an influence on the first director's judgment
when voting on the transaction."133  The Official Comment
emphasizes the need to avoid formalistic analysis within the
parameters of the definition of "qualified director." To determine
whether there is a financial, employment, or professional
relationship, courts should look to "the practicalities of the
situation rather than formalistic circumstances."' 134 So much for
bright lines; this standard comes closest to that articulated by
Delaware courts since Aronson.
Under either standard, then, courts will be confronted with
the need to invest relationships with legal consequence beyond
the actual relationship itself. Under neither standard can courts
avoid a potential messy analysis of relationships. In these
contexts, courts will inevitably have to weigh race, gender, and
class in giving legal consequence to relationships purporting to
affect the business transactions of corporations. But the way a
judge approaches that analysis can significantly affect the
character of the analysis and the likelihood that a particular
conclusion will be reached. Messiness, for example, can be tidied
by taking refuge in formal structural economic analysis.
Analysis can also be simplified by taking refuge in stock stories
and assumptions. It seems the court of chancery did both in the
Disney litigation. Yet the Disney litigation ought to have
provided a rich vehicle for the examination of reality, beyond
formality and stock assumptions, of the intersection of race,
gender, class, and the normative basis of director behavior. It is
133 Id. § 8.62(d). The official comment suggests that this definition is meant to
go "significantly beyond the persons specified in the subcategories of section
8.60(1)(ii) for purposes of the 'conflicting interest' definition-any director whose
familial or financial relationship with [an interested director] or whose employment
or professional relationship with [such director] would be likely to influence the
director's vote on the transaction." Id. § 4 official comment.
134 Id. The Official Comment provides an example: "[A] director employed by a
corporation controlled by [a director with a conflicting interest in a transaction]
should be regarded as having an employment relationship with [that director]." Id.
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to that case, then, that we turn next.
B. The Substance of the Employment Agreement: Waste in In re
the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation135
The court of chancery's approach to the application of
fiduciary duty was both narrow and formalistic. Chancellor
Chandler embraced an approach that rewarded conformity to the
letter of the standard and avoided the need to assess the
importance of actual factual relationships outside their formal
context. This approach had the advantage of simplicity and ease
of application. The opinion's approach suggests a fairly typical
application of tools designed to separate what might be the
minimum that is legally required from what might be good
corporate practice. The Delaware Supreme Court stressed the
distinctions between the two in this case.
All good corporate governance practices include compliance
with statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties.
But the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for
violation of those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals
of ideal corporate governance practices. Aspirational ideals of
good corporate governance practices for boards of directors that
go beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation
law are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders,
sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid
liability. But they are not required by the corporation law and
do not define standards of liability. 136
Because the policy underlying Delaware corporate law does
not appear to merge the two, any legal standard adopted would
have to permit the attainment of aspirational goals without
mandating them. Meeting this objective would require both the
articulation of distinctions between statutory and moral
minimums and the construction of standards to enforce one and
perhaps encourage the other. The latter, according to the Brehm
'35 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
136 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 (citing E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale
for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 53 Bus. LAw. 681, 699-700 (1998)).
But see William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate
Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 139, 165-68 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995). Bratton says that "[t]he very force of the contractarian drive to
suppress the moral conception of fiduciary duty testifies to moralism's enduring
power." Id. at 152.
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court, at least, was at best a "good practice" issue and at worst an
issue for the legislature rather than the courts. 137 An approach
based on formal direct economic relationships, as applied by
Chancellor Chandler, appears to meet all the requirements of
Delaware law in this respect.
As we will see, however, the approach had a great
disadvantage as well. By ignoring the reality of this litigation as
a specific and unique occurrence played out against a dynamic
set of powerful relationships, the court of chancery effectively
rendered judgment over fantasy. This judicial approach and the
nature of its expressions is hardly new and thus-standing
alone-not very interesting for the additional insights it might
provide about the judicial craft or the consequences of its
application.138 In the particular socio-cultural context of early
twenty-first century America, however, Chancellor Chandler
does provide a useful illustration of the way corporate fiduciary
duty formalism is both grounded on and masks embedded
notions of class, race, and gender.
A telling example of the approach adopted by the Chancellor
was his analysis of the duty of care claims. Plaintiffs asserted
that "the directors were not properly informed before they
adopted the Employment Agreement because they did not know
the value of the compensation package offered to Ovitz."'139 The
plaintiffs based this assertion on statements of a Disney financial
advisor.140 This advisor had been quoted as suggesting that
.'[n]obody quantified [the total cost of the severance package]."'4
Consequently, plaintiffs suggested that the board approved the
Employment Agreement without calculating its costs. 42 The
137 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256 & n.30 (citing Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368,
1385 n.36 (Del. 1996)). The Supreme Court singled out the amicus brief filed by the
Council of Institutional Investors for its discussion of corporate "best practice." Id. at
256 n.30.
138 For a discussion of a power theory of judicial decision making, see Larry
Cati Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion
of Judges, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (2003) (examining the nature and basis
of western judicial authority in the context of historical priestly functions); Larry
Cati Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law and the
Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291, 291 (2000) (examining the
"cultural basis of judicial authority").
139 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del. Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
140 See id. at 361-62.
141 See id. at 361; see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 251.
142 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 361-62.
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court of chancery rejected this argument. As long as the board of
directors understood the manner in which the contract terms
would be applied-as long as the terms of the Employment
Agreement had been reviewed by them in whatever form the
board deemed appropriate-the fact that the board chose not to
inform itself of the cost of the application of those provisions was
irrelevant, at least from a legal perspective. 143 The Chancellor
applied a peculiar form of the rule of reason: a board is not
required to be informed of every fact but just to be reasonably
informed.144 The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to plead
facts giving rise to a reasonable doubt that the board, as a matter
of law, was not reasonably informed of the issues relating to the
Employment Agreement. 145
By 2003 the court of chancery, reviewing a sufficiency
challenge to the plaintiffs' second amended derivative complaint,
concluded that, as amended, the "new allegations give rise to a
cognizable question whether the defendant directors of the Walt
Disney Company should be held personally liable to the
corporation for a knowing or intentional lack of due care in the
directors' decision-making process regarding" the Employment
Agreement. 146 Despite Chancellor Chandler's reluctance to
"second-guess the business judgment of a disinterested and
independent board of directors," 147 the Chancellor agreed that
plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to suggest that "the Disney
directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to
make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to
Disney and its stockholders."1 48 Interestingly, the Chancellor
continued to assert that the Disney board was disinterested and
independent. It is to these two issues that we now turn our
attention.
C. The Analytics of Director Independence in In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litigation 149




146 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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nowhere better evidenced than in the analysis of Eisner's interest
in the Employment Agreement and Eisner's domination and
control of the Disney board. Chancellor Chandler began by
stressing the need for neutral analysis. 150 When the Delaware
General Corporation Law is followed, a large severance package
is just as valid as a decision to authorize a loan, and courts do not
overrule a board's decision to approve and honor a severance
package merely because of its size. 151 The Chancellor stressed
that Michael Ovitz "gave up his lucrative position at CAA to
come to Disney and was rewarded handsomely for it, both in
salary... and in potential severance."'15 2 After fourteen months,
it became apparent that Ovitz was not working out as president
so he left the company, at which time "the Board awarded him
the significant amount of severance detailed in his employment
agreement."' 53 In determining if the board exceeded its authority
in providing a severance package that is possibly larger than any
ever paid, 54 the court would analyze the plaintiffs' claims using
the same tools that it would use in any corporate law case: the
requirement of demand or its excusal, the Aronson v. Lewis 55
test, the basic rules of disclosure, and the business judgment
rule. 56
The plaintiffs asserted four claims 157 in connection with the
Employment Agreement. 158 The plaintiffs' first claim alleged
that the board breached its duties of loyalty, good faith, and due
care by entering into the Employment Agreement with Ovitz and
150 Id. at 350-51 (emphasizing that the exceptionally large dollar amount
involved would not bias the court's application of conventional corporate governance
laws).




155 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) ("In a Rule 23.1 determination of pleading
sufficiency... our scope of review must be de novo. To the extent Aronson and its
progeny contain dicta expressing or suggesting an abuse of discretion scope of
review, that language is overruled.").
156 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 350-51.
157 Only the first two claims will be discussed in this Article. The third count
was asserted against Ovitz for breaching the Agreement and the fourth count was
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then terminating him without cause. 159 Secondly, the plaintiffs'
alleged waste stemming from the Employment Agreement. 160
The case first came to Chancellor Chandler 16' on the defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint,' 62 arguing that the plaintiffs
failed to make a demand on the board or to allege particularized
facts that excuse such a demand. 163 Defendants also argued that
plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a claim against them because
Disney's certificate of incorporation bars liability for claims based
on a breach of the duty of care. 64
1. Eisner's Interest in the Transaction: The Basis of the Initial
Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Waste Claims
The court of chancery first looks at whether the plaintiffs are
excused from making a demand on the board before filing a
lawsuit.' 65 Under Aronson, demand is considered excused only if
the facts alleged create a reasonable doubt that: "1) [at least half
of] the directors are disinterested and independent; or 2) the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment."' 66 In order to create a reasonable
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 According to the official web site maintained by the State of Delaware:
The Honorable William B. Chandler III was appointed Chancellor of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in 1997, where he had served as Vice
Chancellor since 1989. He also served as Resident Judge of the Delaware
Superior Court from 1985 to 1989. He received his law degrees from the
University of South Carolina School of Law and the Yale Law School and
his undergraduate degree from the University of Delaware.
Before his appointment to the Court, Chancellor Chandler was an
associate with Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell and he served as Legal
Counsel to former Governor Pete duPont. The Chancellor taught
commercial law, legislative process, and remedies for two years at the
University of Alabama School of Law. He is presently a member of the
American Law Institute and the Delaware Bar Association.
First State Judiciary, Court of Chancery Judges, http://courts.delaware.gov/
Courts/Court%20ofo2OChancery/?judoff.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
162 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 353. Under Delaware
law, there are two ways to dismiss a motion. "Where under any set of facts
consistent with the facts alleged in the complaint the plaintiff would not be entitled
to judgment, the complaint may be dismissed as legally defective .... [W]here a
plaintiffs allegations are merely conclusory... they are similarly insufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss." Id. (footnote omitted).
163 See id.
164 Id. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2004).
165 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 353.
166 Id. at 354.
1042
2005] RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND DISNEY-OVITZ
doubt that a director is disinterested, it must be demonstrated
that "a director 'will receive a personal financial benefit from a
transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders'
or ... that 'a corporate decision will have a materially
detrimental impact on a director, but not on the corporation and
the stockholders."' 167 A board member is considered disinterested
if he does not stand to benefit financially or suffer materially
from the decision. 168
Relying on their reading of the standard in Aronson,
plaintiffs offered several reasons to support their allegations of
board domination. "Eisner was personally interested in
obtaining the Board's approval of the... Agreement" and "a
majority of the Board could not exercise business judgment
independent of Eisner in deciding whether to approve
the.. . Agreement."'169 Of the fifteen board members who would
have reviewed the plaintiffs' demand, at least twelve of them
"had such strong ties to Eisner that they would not have been
able to make an impartial decision .. ".."170 The plaintiffs
suggested that Eisner's personal relationship with Ovitz caused
Eisner to be interested in obtaining the board's approval of the
Employment Agreement.' 7' The Chancellor found no support for
this theory under Delaware law: 72 "The fact that Eisner has
long-standing personal and business ties to Ovitz cannot
overcome the presumption of independence that all directors,
including Eisner, are afforded."' 73 Plaintiffs then alleged that
Eisner had an interest in the Employment Agreement as a
vehicle for maximizing his own income from Disney. 174 By
setting a high baseline for compensation, plaintiffs suggested,
Eisner would be able to negotiate a better package for himself.
75
The Chahcellor rejected this argument, 76 inferring from the facts
an opposite motivation: At the time of the negotiation of the
Employment Agreement, Eisner owned several million options in
167 Id. (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)).
168 Id.










Disney stock, so it would not have been in Eisner's economic
interest potentially to affect the value of that interest negatively
through the issuance of millions of additional options to Ovitz. 177
2. The Chancery Court's Domination Analysis
Plaintiffs claimed that certain director's individual ties to
Eisner "create[d] at least a reasonable doubt ... that the Disney
Board of Directors would have honestly considered a demand in
connection with the approval of the Employment Agreement.' 78
The court noted, however, that 'speculation on motives ... [is]
wholly insufficient to establish a case of demand dismissal. '" '179
While the court admitted that some of the issues were close calls,
it held that most of the allegations did not survive under
Aronson.180 The court found that demand under the first prong of
Aronson had not been met because a majority of the directors
were either disinterested or not dominated by an interested
person in reviewing and approving the Employment
Agreement.' 8 ' Had the plaintiffs been able to raise a reasonable
doubt about the independence of a sufficient number of directors
with respect to the board's consideration of Ovitz's compensation,
then demand would have been excused. 182 In support of the
court's conclusion, Chancellor Chandler provided a detailed
analysis of the relationship between Eisner and twelve members
of the Disney board that plaintiffs asserted lacked independence.
Together, these twelve, along with Eisner, constituted a majority
of the Disney board.
a. Roy E. Disney
The plaintiffs alleged that Roy Disney was unable to exercise
independent judgment because he was an employee of Disney
whose salary was determined by the board and, as an officer, he
was accountable to and subject to termination by Eisner. 8 3 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, reasoning that Mr. Disney
could exercise independent judgment because his compensation
177 See id. at 355-56.
178 Id. at 356.
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 361.
182 See id.
183 Id. at 356.
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was significant, his compensation was set by the board and not
solely by Eisner, and he and his family owned almost 8.4 million
shares of stock.'8 4 The court inferred from these economic facts
that Mr. Disney, as an "economically rational individual," would
give priority to protecting the value of his own economic interests
over those of Eisner and would not risk those interests "in order
to placate Eisner."18 5 Because Roy Disney was very wealthy and
because he appeared to have a powerful and influential voice
within Disney itself, he had no reason to fear Eisner and
therefore could not be said to be dominated by Eisner.
b. Sanford M. Litvak and Richard A. Nunis
Plaintiffs argued that, like Roy Disney, both Nunis and
Litvak were well-paid officers of Disney whose salaries were
determined by the board of directors and whose jobs and careers
were dependent on Eisner's good will. The court of chancery
recited the general rule that neither lost his presumption of
independence merely because he was an officer.18 6 The court of
chancery found no merit in the argument that either was
interested in the Employment Agreement on the basis of a
general desire to raise compensation levels throughout the
company. 8 7 Neither was as wealthy as Roy Disney, nor was
either as influential within the company as shareholders.
Because they were poorer-in relative terms-and less well
connected, they might be more dependent on their jobs-and the
money and power it provided-and on that basis might be
beholden to Eisner.18 8  Because the court of chancery was
reluctant to find that Eisner was interested in the Employment
Agreement, however, neither Litvack's nor Nunis's dependence
on Eisner had legal effect.
c. Stanley P. Gold
The plaintiffs argued that Gold was beholden to Roy Disney
because he was Mr. Disney's personal attorney as well as the
president and CEO of a company wholly-owned by Mr. Disney.'
89
184 Id.
185 Id. at 356-57.
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That relationship of domination was sufficient to call the
Employment Agreement action into question only if Eisner, in
turn, dominated Roy Disney.1 90 The court of chancery was not
persuaded. The chain of domination was too tenuous. In any
case, the court of chancery was unconvinced that Disney was
dominated by Eisner.191
d. Robert A.M. Stern
"Plaintiffs alleged that director Robert A.M. Stern's financial
dealings ... were sufficiently large to cast a reasonable doubt
upon his ability to consider a demand disinterestedly."1 92 Stern
had been commissioned to design several buildings for Eisner
and Disney for which his architectural firm had collected millions
of dollars in fees. 193 The court of chancery agreed that this raised
a reasonable doubt that Stern could exercise judgment
independent of Eisner's influence. 194
e. E. Cardon Walker
The plaintiffs asserted that Walker was not independent
because he consulted for Disney, invested in Disney films, and
received substantial sums for these investments. 95 Chancellor
Chandler limited his analysis; the only facts relevant to an
independence analysis in Walker's case related solely to the
formal contractual arrangements between Walker and Eisner, of





194 The court of chancery explained:
A number of factors affect my judgment. On the one hand, Plaintiffs admit
that the fees that Stern's architectural firm have received are in decline,
and that Eisner has gone on record stating that "Stern is unlikely to get
new Disney contracts while on the Board." Nevertheless, fees have
continued to flow from Disney to Stern's firm, and the fees received in the
past, from both Disney and Eisner, have been quite substantial.
Id. at 357-58.
195 Id. at 358. Disney's SEC filings, however, reveal that E. Cardon Walker had
been a director since 1960, was president from 1971 to 1977, and Chairman of the
Board and CEO from 1980 to 1983. From 1984 through 1989, he provided consulting
and other services to the company. Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule
14A), at 6 (Jan. 9, 1997), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
10010 3 9/0000 8 9 8 430-97-000058.txt.
196 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 358.
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was between Walker and Disney rather than between Walker
and Eisner, it provided no basis for finding a relationship of
dependence between Walker and Eisner. Chancellor Chandler
apparently gave no weight to the possibility that Eisner could
affect Walker's compensation under the consulting agreement,
without breaching its terms, by determining the amount of
consulting Walker would do. Moreover, the court of chancery
gave great weight to the fact that the contract itself pre-dated
Eisner's tenure at Disney. On that basis, the Chancellor found
that plaintiffs had not demonstrated Walker's lack of
independence. 197
f Gary L. Wilson
Wilson is alleged to have lacked independence and was
beholden to Eisner because Eisner rewarded Wilson when he
retired from Disney and because Disney paid for a design done by
Wilson's wife. 198 The court of chancery found that Wilson was
independent. The Chancellor rejected gratitude for past largesse
as a basis for finding lack of independence, at least in the
absence of evidence of an expectation of additional compensation,
the amount of which could be controlled by Eisner.1 99 The only
current payment alleged was in the form of compensation to the
design firm of Wilson's wife for work performed. The amount of
the compensation-$121,1 2 2-was deemed immaterial to Wilson
who the Chancellor noted was a man "who received a bonus and
stock options that, by Plaintiffs' own estimations, have resulted
in over $70 million in income realized so far."200 Thus, it seems
the $70 million in payments to date was insufficient to raise a
concern about gratitude-and control-but singularly important
in defeating a claim that a current payment, very small by
comparison, did not affect Wilson's independence.
g. Leo J. O'Donovan
It is alleged that O'Donovan, who at the time was the
president of Georgetown University, was incapable of rendering
independent business judgment because Georgetown University
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recipient of over $1 million in donations from Eisner since
1989.201 To avoid a determination of control, the Chancellor had
to distinguish Lewis v. Fuqua.20 2  Chancellor Chandler
accomplished this on two grounds. First, he suggested that in
order for lack of independence to be shown under Fuqua,
plaintiffs would have to show that there were substantial
political and financial dealings between the dominating person
(Eisner) and the beholden person (O'Donovan).203 That element
was missing in this case because Eisner and O'Donovan did not
have substantial dealing outside of their relationship at Disney
and Eisner's donations to Georgetown. Second, a critical element
for a finding of dependence in these circumstances was the
existence of a pattern of "interlocking directorship[s]."204 That
element was missing in this case because Eisner was not on the
board of Georgetown. Even in the absence of the standards in
Fuqua, the Chancellor was unconvinced that "Eisner exerted
such an influence on O'Donovan that O'Donovan could not
exercise independent judgment as a director. 205  First,
O'Donovan could receive no personal benefit from Eisner.206 That
seemed to provide O'Donovan with additional insulation from
allegations of susceptibility to influence. The Chancellor was
unaffected, it seems, by the possibility that Eisner might be
induced to make further donations to Georgetown or such other
201 Id. at 359.
202 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
203 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359. In Fuqua,
Sanford, the president of Duke, had received over $10 million in donations at a time
when he had numerous political and financial dealings with the dominating board
member. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 966-67.
204 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359. Sanford and
Fuqua served as directors together both on the board whose actions were being
questioned as well as on the Board of Trustees of Duke University. Fuqua, 502 A.2d
at 966-67.
205 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359.
206 The Chancellor tells us that O'Donovan, as a Jesuit and a priest, was
forbidden from collecting the usual director's fees. Id. The company's SEC filings,
however, suggest another version not considered by the Chancellor:
Nonemployee directors may defer payment of all or part of their fees under
the Company's Deferred Compensation Plan for Outside Directors. Such
deferrals are generally until termination of the director's service with the
Company or until he or she reaches a specified age. Ms. Bowers, Fr.
O'Donovan and Mr. Murphy are currently participating in this plan.
Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 6 (Jan. 9, 1997), available at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001039/0000898430.97.000058.txt. It is possible,
however, that O'Donovan would never have received the benefit directly.
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worthy causes as might be dear to the heart of Father O'Donovan
during the period in question or thereafter and that such
amenability to donation might depend on Eisner's good will.
h. George W. Mitchell
George Mitchell was a well-known former United States
Senator with wide personal interests.20 7 The independence of
Mitchell was questioned because of his relationship as special
counsel to a law firm that Disney had engaged on several matters
and to which Disney had paid fees of $122,764 in 1996.208
Mitchell also served as a consultant to Disney for which Mitchell
received $50,000 in 1996.209 The Chancellor, however, found
these relationships insufficient to create a relationship of
domination between Eisner and Mitchell. 210  First, because
Mitchell was "special counsel" rather than "partner" in the law
firm in question, it was not clear that he shared in the profits
generated by the fees paid by Disney.211  Since he did not
personally and directly benefit from the fees received by the law
firm, the relationship between the firm and Disney was
discounted. Second, the Chancellor thought the $50,000 in fees
received was immaterial to Mitchell, "a nationally known legal
and political figure. 212
i. Irwin E. Russell
Russell served as Eisner's personal counsel and had a "long
history of personal and business ties to Eisner."21 3  Russell's
office was listed as Eisner's primary residence. 21 4  Russell
represented Eisner in connection with Eisner's Compensation
Agreement. 21 5 In addition, plaintiffs asserted that a large portion
of the total amount of fees received by Russell's firm originated
with Eisner. 216 The court of chancery concluded that "[p]laintiffs
207 See United States Congress, George John Mitchell-Biographical
Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M00811 (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005).
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ha[d] raised a reasonable doubt as to Russell's independence of
Eisner's influence for the purpose of considering a demand. 217
j. Sidney Poitier
Sidney Poitier, a well-known actor,218 was alleged to have
been beholden to Ovitz (rather than Eisner).219 The plaintiffs
alleged that Poitier could not exercise independent businessjudgment with respect to the Employment Agreement because
Poitier had been a long time client of both CAA and Ovitz
through which he had earned millions of dollars.220 Despite the
fact that Poitier and Ovitz had a long-time personal and
professional relationship, the court of chancery found no
conflict. 221 First, Ovitz was no longer associated with CAA and,
second, "it does not follow that Poitier is incapable of considering
Ovitz's compensation package without bias. '222 The court of
chancery would have found lack of independence only had
plaintiffs been able to show that Poitier continued to receive
material benefits from CAA while Ovitz was connected to CAA. 223
k. Reveta Bowers224
Bowers was the principal of the elementary school that
Eisner's children attended.225 The plaintiffs argued that she was
beholden to Eisner because of her low salary as an educator
compared to the payments and stock options she received for her
217 Id.
218 Sir Sidney Poitier, a Knight Commander of the British Empire, is an
African-American actor born in Miami, Florida in 1927 and raised in the Bahamas.
He received the Academy Award for Best Actor in 1963 for his role in Lilies of the
Field, and received the Academy's Lifetime Achievement Award in 2002. He has
served as the Bahamian Ambassador to Japan since 1997. In addition to a role in
the feature film The Jackal (Universal Studios) in 1997, Sir Poitier engaged in
several documentary projects in the 1990s. See PBS, American Masters: SidneyPoitier, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/americanmasters/database/poitier-s.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005); see also The Internet Movie Database, Biography for Sidney
Poitier, http://www.imdb.comname/nm0OO01627/bio (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
219 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360-61.
220 Id.
221 See id. at 361.
222 Id.
223 See id.
224 For a detailed description of the chancery court's analysis, see supra notes
23-33 and accompanying text.
225 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359.
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services as a director of Disney. 226 The court of chancery declined
the plaintiffs' invitation to find Bowers dominated by Eisner.
227
Chancellor Chandler grounded this conclusion on one of two
alternative bases. First, the Chancellor determined that all the
plaintiffs had done was allege that Bowers was dominated
because she received fees for her work as a director.
228
"[W]ithout more" this bare fact was insufficient to establish a
financial interest, and any other conclusion "would [] overrule the
Delaware Supreme Court."229  The alternative basis for the
Chancellor's determination rested on policy grounds. 230 Any
decision that would apply a financial interest analysis where
people of relatively modest means-what the Chancellor termed
"regular folks"231-would effectively create a presumption that
poor people are dominated by the richer people who helped
elevate them to board membership. 232 The court of chancery was
unwilling to reach that conclusion and use Bowers to facilitate
the construction of a presumption of dependence of the poor.
233
3. Contradictions in a Small Space: The Difficulties of Formalist
Economic Analysis of Dependence
From the cases available, Chancellor Chandler distilled a
number of rules that he attempted to use consistently in
evaluating the various claims challenging the independence of
the directors. It is not clear, though, what rules were actually
distilled or that the Chancellor actually consistently applied the
rules extracted from the cases. I will suggest here that the
Chancellor attempted to frame the factual inquiry of dependence
within a fairly narrow formalist economic framework. 234 The
object was fairly straightforward as well-to avoid the creation of
presumptions that particular forms of relationships between or
226 Id.







234 Chancellor Chandler explained: "Plaintiffs allege that the personal
interrelationships among the directors somehow render the Director Defendants
interested in the disputed transaction. Demand is not excused, however, just
because directors would have to sue 'their friends, family and business associates."'
Id. at 354 n.18 (citing Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 256 (D.N.J. 1991)).
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with directors, or otherwise between actors in a corporation, are
hierarchical and therefore more likely to lead to domination. 235
This skepticism has an underlying policy basis: the preservation
of the broad flexibility with respect to governance that has been
the hallmark of Delaware law for several generations. It is from
this presumption of independence that Chancellor Chandler
began his analysis.23 6 Assuming that Chancellor Chandler was
correct-an assumption I challenge in the next section-we
might profit from a close analysis of the rule and its application
in Disney.
The standard for determining actionable domination and
control is simple to articulate, and the Delaware courts have
indulged in its articulation with some frequency. Chancellor
Chandler articulated it as a form of a process standard:
"Plaintiffs must demonstrate first that Eisner was personally
interested in obtaining the Board's approval of the Employment
Agreement and, second, that a majority of the Board could not
exercise business judgment independent of Eisner in deciding
whether to approve the Employment Agreement."237 The
Chancellor derived this version of the standard from two prior
versions of the standard memorialized in prior Delaware
Supreme Court opinions.238
Thus, the court of chancery begins with the initial and only
permitted presumption in the context of domination analysis:
Directors are presumed independent. To overcome that standard
235 Thus, Chancellor Chandler embraced a reading of "the Delaware rule that
'[s]peculation on motives for undertaking corporate action are [sic] whollyinsufficient to establish a case of demand dismissal."' Id. at 356 (citing Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988)).
236 Thus, for example, as the Aronson court had explained: "The requirement of
director independence inheres in the conception and rationale of the businessjudgment rule. The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise of businessjudgment is based in part on this unyielding precept." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 816 (Del. 1984). See, e.g., 1 RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH, & ANDREW
J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.2.1 (4th
ed. 2005).
237 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 355.
238 See id. at 355 n.19. The first of these memorializations was from Aronson:
"There must be coupled with the allegation of control such facts as would
demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden
to the controlling person." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815. The second was from Grobow:
"This would require plaintiffs to allege with particularity that the ... directors were
dominated or otherwise controlled by an individual or entity interested in the
transaction." Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).
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plaintiffs will have to "show a reasonable doubt as to the
disinterest of at least half of the directors."239  Twice, the
Chancellor also cited to what he viewed as the basis of the
character of the proof required: "Plaintiffs must overcome the
Delaware rule that '[s]peculation on motives for undertaking
corporate action are [sic] wholly insufficient to establish a case of
demand dismissal."'240
There were a number of other rules and presumptions cited
by the Chancellor in his analysis of the proof submitted by
plaintiffs with respect to the domination of the Disney Board of
Directors. These rules, unlike the more general standard,
appeared to apply only to individuals, or smaller sets of director
defendants.
a. Disney /Litvack/Nunis
"I note at the outset the general Delaware rule that 'the fact
that they hold positions with the company [controlled by
Eisner] ... is no more disqualifying than is the fact that he
designated them as directors."' 241 In addition, independence, or
lack of independence, can be shown by an analysis of the
difference between the sums earned that could be influenced by
the dominating director and other wealth.
242
b. Gold/ Walker/Russell
The relationship between the dominated and dominating
party must be direct in order to overcome the presumption.
243
239 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 354 (citing Steiner v.
Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)).
240 Id. at 356 (citation omitted); see also id. at 357 n.26.
241 Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
242 Thus, the Chancellor determined that Roy Disney could not be dominated by
Eisner. Roy Disney's salary, stock options, and director remuneration were very
small compared to the very large share stake Roy Disney held in Disney,
independent of the control of Eisner. By contrast, Litvack and Nunis might be
dominated by Eisner. Their salaries at Disney, though set by the Board as a whole,
were, to some extent, influenced by Eisner. Moreover, the men's other assets, as an
overall proportion of their wealth, were more limited. Eisner's potential control of so
large a source of the men's income might be enough to overcome the presumption of
independence. Id. at 356-57.
243 Gold, as Roy Disney's attorney, could be dominated by Disney but not by
Eisner absent a showing that Disney himself was dominated. In the case of Walker,
the relationship between Walker and Disney was not determinative of a possibility
of domination because the sums Walker received from Disney resulted from a
contract established prior to Eisner's domination of the Disney Board. Id. at 357-58.
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Serving as the attorney for the dominating person, rather than
for the entity that is subject to the dominating person's will,
strongly suggests domination. 244 But domination is still subject
to an income test-the fees received in such service must be
substantial.245
c. Stern/ Wilson/Mitchell
The Chancellor rejected the "subject to a controlling
influence that could reasonably be expected to affect the
director's judgment" standard in favor of a standard requiring
factual evidence of actual influence. 246 On the other hand, where
an independent contractor continues to receive substantial fees
from the company and had received substantial fees from the
dominating person in the past, that payment may be sufficient to
overcome the presumption of independence.247 In order to
244 Russell was Eisner's personal attorney, and Russell's law office served as
Eisner's official address. In addition, Russell was the registered agent for a number
of Eisner entities, and Russell represented Eisner in the negotiation of Eisner's own
compensation agreement. Id. at 360.
245 Russell's firm derived a substantial part of its total income from Eisner. Id.
Compare that to the fees received by either Wilson or Mitchell (insignificant) orStern (material). See discussion infra notes 246-50, 259-61.
246 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 357 n.28 (rejecting the
approach of the Revised MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.44(c) (1996) and ALI PRINCIPLES
OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 1.23(1) (1994)). The Chancellor cited three cases in support
of this approach. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1979), was cited for
the proposition that the receipt of substantial legal fees is inadequate to establish
domination absent facts showing a direct connection between the payment of the
fees and the action of the dominated director. Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 722 F.Supp. 1054, 1063-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), was cited for the proposition that the mere
existence of an attorney client relationship is not sufficient to overcome thepresumption of director independence. Lastly, Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp. 759,
768 (D.N.J. 1985), was cited to support a New Jersey court's interpretation of
Delaware law to the effect that an attorney client relationship generating $4.6
million in fees, standing alone, was insufficient to demonstrate interest on the part
of the attorney director without further proof of other improprieties. The Chancellor,
however, did not appear to rely on Delaware cases for this proposition and did little
to suggest why the standard suggested in the Model Business Corporation Act did
not reflect Delaware law.
247 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 358. Both Stern and
Wilson received payments from Disney, but Stern's firm also received payments
from Eisner in the past in amounts the Chancellor determined to be substantial. The$121,122 fee paid to Wilson's wife's firm was deemed insubstantial by comparison to
Wilson's $70 million total income, much of which had been paid by Disney. See id.Mitchell received fees directly from Disney for consulting work. Id. It is also likely
that Disney and Eisner would have a say in the volume of future work. But the
amount received for those services was $50,000, a sum the Chancellor found
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determine whether sums received are substantial, the court will
review the amounts received in light of the person's position in
society.2 48 Otherwise, the court will compare the size of the fees
to the person's other income 249 or will look to whether the fees for
work are continuing and otherwise substantial in comparison to
the income of the firm with which a director may be associated.
250
d. O'Donovan
Where the relationship between dominating and dominated
parties is one involving charitable or other forms of donation, the
presumption of independence can be overcome only when the
plaintiff can show multiple political and financial dealings
between the parties and where each serves as a director in the
entity in which the other dominates.
251
e. Bowers
Payments of director's fees "without more, do not establish
any financial interest"25 2 and great disparities between amounts
earned as a director and other remuneration without more does
not demonstrate lack of independence.
253
f. Poitier
The strength of a prior business or personal relationship,
insignificant. Id. at 360. The Chancellor discounted any likelihood that Eisner's
potential influence on the rate of future consulting service assignments would
influence Mitchell. Mitchell's firm also received fees for work done for Disney. Here
again, the amount of the fees-about $122,764-was deemed immaterial for
purposes of overcoming the presumption of Mitchell's independence. See id.
248 "Plaintiffs have not alleged that the $50,000 in consulting fees was even
material to Mitchell, a nationally known legal and political figure." Id. at 360.
249 "The $121,122 payment to Wilson's wife's design firm for services performed
is immaterial to Wilson, a man who received a bonus and stock options that.., have
resulted in over $70 million in income realized so far." Id. at 358.
250 The Chancellor viewed the statement that Disney would not award
additional contracts to Stern as a fact supporting independence. On the other hand,
the Chancellor found the fact that Stern's firm continued to receive substantial fees
to be a strong negative. See id. at 357-58.
251 See id. at 359 (interpreting Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985)). In
a sense this statement appears to be a contextualized version of the rule applied to
Stern. See supra note 241. According to the Chancellor, actual misconduct
proximately caused by the relationship of domination is required. Anything else
serves to create a presumption of lack of independence based merely on status. See
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359.
252 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
253 See id.
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without more, is insufficient to overcome the presumption ofindependence.254 This rule is sometimes combined with the rule
of direct relationship.255 Personal relationships fall within the
general rule of conjecture and speculation and thus may beignored by the Chancellor in determining lack of independence.256
But I also suspect the "Mitchell celebrity rule" might have been
applied here as well.257
4. Series of Interconnected Rules of Limited Applicability
The Chancellor's episodic descriptions of the additional
permutations of the ingredients of the legal standard for
overcoming the presumption of director independence can be
generalized as a series of interconnected rules that increase theburden on plaintiffs to prove that a director may be dominated
and thus not independent.
a. The Rule of Against Reliance on Speculation
"Speculation on motives for undertaking corporate action
are wholly insufficient to establish a case of demand excusal."258
This is a rule of general applicability unless the director is wellknown, in which case it may not apply in the same way. Thus,for example, the Chancellor had no problem speculating thatformer Senator Mitchell's prominence made the receipt of$50,000 in fees, and control of the prospects of earning more feesimmaterial to Mitchell. 259 Likewise, apparently little explanation
was necessary to conclude that Poitier was able to consider
254 See id. at 361. Poitier had been represented by CAA for years and earned
millions of dollars through the efforts of that agency during the time it was headedby Ovitz. See id. at 360. The Chancellor then suggested that his "judgment might be
otherwise if Poitier continued to receive material benefits from CAA and Ovitz was
concurrently involved with that firm." Id. at 361.
255 See supra note 242 and accompanying text. Thus, the Chancellor discountedthat relationship, or the money it produced, on the grounds that while the
relationship might continue to exist, by the time of the termination of theEmployment Agreement, Ovitz was no longer head of CAA. See In re Walt Disney Co.Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 361. The Chancellor, however, does not explain howthat affects the relationship at the time of the negotiation of the EmploymentAgreement, while Ovitz was still in transition from CAA to Disney. See id. at 360-
61.
256 "Such an assertion is based on conjecture, and Plaintiffs have not raised a
reasonable doubt as to Poitier's independence." Id. at 361.
257 See supra Part I.C.3.c. and accompanying footnotes.
258 Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).
259 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
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Ovitz's "compensation package without bias."
260
b. The Rule of Direct Relationship and Quid Pro Quo
Financial relationships that are indirect carry little weight
in assessments of domination, even where the dominating person
controls the entity with which the dominated person has a
relationship. Thus, the court attached importance to the fact
that, although Cardon Walker had a significant ongoing financial
relationship with Disney, the arrangement was not personal to
Eisner. Wilson's receipt of substantial amounts from Disney was
discounted for failure to show a direct connection between the
receipt of financial benefit and approval of the Employment
Agreement. 261 Institutional "beholding" does not give rise to an
inference of dependence. Likewise, the fact that Senator
Mitchell's law firm-rather than Senator Mitchell himself-
received fees, or the fact that Wilson's spouse's firm-rather than
Wilson himself-received fees was important for determining
independence. 262 The fact that Stern's architectural firm, rather
than Stern himself, earned architectural fees, however, was not
enough to insulate Stern from a suggestion of domination
because the sums received were significant and their receipt
ongoing.263
c. The Rule that Relative Size Matters
Roy Disney and his family have personal wealth measured in
the billions of dollars.264 Sanford Litvack and Richard Nunis do
not. Disney is unlikely to be dominated even though he receives
a substantial salary as a Disney officer. Litvack and Nunis may
be dominated because they each receive a substantial salary as a
Disney officer. 265 This rule is simple but subject to an important
exception. A different rule applies when the disparity between
pay from Disney and other sources of revenue are not directly
connected. In that case, even substantial payments may be
discounted as forming less of a connection between dominated
260 See id. at 361.
261 See id. at 358.
262 See id. at 360.
263 See id. at 357.
264 Dominic Rushe, The Red Raider; Business Focus, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), May
15, 2005 (Business Section), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/
0,,2095-1612284,00.html.
265 See supra Part I.C.2.b and accompanying footnotes.
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and non-dominated individuals. On the other hand, the different
rule may be related to the character of the financial connection to
the corporation. The "size matters" rule may apply to salaries
and fees for services as employees, such as Stern's compensation.
But the rule may not apply to "special case" fees, such as for
services as directors. Alternatively, the rule of financial
materiality may not apply, especially to school principals and
other "regular folks," such as Bowers.266 This "regular folks"
exception applies irrespective of any other relationship between
the director and the dominating party.
d. The Rule of Intimate Relationship
Giving money to an organization headed by a director who is
under challenge does not overcome the presumption of director
independence from the donor. This is true even if the sums given
are substantial, as in O'Donovan's case,267 unless the relationshipbetween donor and donee is intimate, extensive, and a breach of
the rule of quid pro quo. In the absence of both a personal andprofessional interconnection, the rule of direct relationship seems
to apply.
e. The Rule of Timeliness
For Delaware courts, the past, or even the recent past, can
recede to legal insignificance, failing to give rise to an inference
of continuing obligation or current disposition. 268 When
combined with the rule of direct relationship, the rule becomes a
virtual presumption that a past relationship, financial or
otherwise, no matter how significant, is immaterial for purposes
of determining domination. On the other hand, if fees received
were substantial, as the court of chancery suggested they were toStern, then the rule does not apply. On the other hand, this
exception itself does not apply where substantial financialbenefits were received by a famous person-Poitier-even where
the object of influence is the person who was instrumental in
attaining the past benefits for the challenged director.269
266 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
267 See id. at 359.
268 See id. at 354 & n.18, 355 & n.20 (describing Delaware precedent that
receipt of customary payments and longstanding past relationships are insufficient
to demonstrate conflict of interest).
269 See id. at 361 (holding that there was not enough evidence to show that
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f. The Rule that Celebrity Matters
Even the relatively poor may avoid the suggestion of
domination when they are famous enough. Win an academy
award,270 or serve as a member of the United States Senate,
271
and the other rules may not apply. This applies to fees earned by
firms with which one may be connected.
272 The celebrity rule
also reduces the importance of business relationships between
the celebrity and the corporation.273 It also applies to business
relationships with the former employer of the person whose
contract is to be approved.274 Of course, the courts have not been
specific on the nature of the celebrity necessary for application of
the presumptions of this rule. Clearly, movie stars and political
figures come within its definition of celebrity. Business
executives and school principals do not. But it is hard to
reconcile this rule, as applied, with the theory advanced by the
chancery court in justifying its conclusions of independence.
Taken together, the rules applied by the Chancellor are
troublesome. They appear to be more useful for determining
interest rather than influence. To use them to determine
independence appears to amount to use of a standard with little
relevance to the issue. Other rules are situational and thus less
than useful for extracting rules for future application.
275 The
rules, taken as a whole, do not seem to be predicated on the
Sidney Poitier was impermissibly conflicted).
270 See supra note 218.
271 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
272 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
273 Id. ($50,000 consulting fee not material to former Senator Mitchell).
274 Id. at 360-61 (Relationship between Poitier and CAA discounted because
with the approval of the Employment Agreement, Ovitz would no longer 
be
connected to CAA).
275 Although my analysis is limited to the Chancellor's Disney opinion, that
opinion represents a thoughtful and well-executed application of Delaware law in
this regard. For the contradictions of situational application of the rules binding the
Chancellor, compare Benerofe v. Cha, No. 14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3-4 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 20, 1998) (explaining that a director's position as an officer may be sufficient to
doubt his independence from controlling shareholder), with Lewis v. Aronson, No.
6919, 1985 WL 11553, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 1, 1985) (holding that the fact that
directors are officers does not create a presumption of domination). For the same
inconsistency with respect to the consequences of employment of a director as the
company's outside counsel, compare Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL
441999, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995) (holding that status as outside counsel may
overcome presumption of independence), with Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789,
794 (2d Cir. 1979) (ruling that no such presumption is created).
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principles of predictability and consistency.
The difficulty of consistently applying the director
independence rules as announced by Chancellor Chandler in
Disney is particularly well illustrated when one attempts to
apply them to Reveta Bowers. Indeed, a close analysis of the
case suggests that Chancellor Chandler might have applied his
own rules to very different effect in Disney or that the rulesproduce a system empowering courts to act arbitrarily by
constructing rules that suit preferred outcomes.
Assume all that is known about Reveta Bowers is what is
contained in the Chancellor's opinion in Disney: Bowers is theprincipal of an elementary school once attended by the children
of Eisner, and, as a principal, her salary is low compared to her
fees and the value of her stock options received for services as adirector of Disney.276 We can also assume that, but for the fact
that his children attended the school where she was employed,
Ms. Bowers might never have come to the attention of Eisner
and, therefore, might never have been asked to serve on the
Disney Board of Directors.
Reveta Bowers did not own or control a large number of
shares of Disney stock.27 7 In this respect she more resembled
Sanford Litvack and Richard Nunis than Roy Disney. Reveta
Bowers did not appear to be independently wealthy or even as
wealthy as Litvack or Nunis, much less Disney. 278  Unlike
Disney, Litvack, and Nunis, Bowers received no salary as an
employee of Disney.279 But like the three of them, she received
fees and stock for her services as director.280 Those fees are
substantial in relation to her salary and have been madepossible, and continued, only through the strength of her
relationship with Eisner. If the rule of direct relationship and
quid pro quo and the rule that relative size does matter were
applied to Bowers as they were applied to Disney, Litvack, andNunis, then, based on the Chancellor's own interpretation, there
is a strong case that Bowers was not independent. Bowers'
benefit from her association with Disney is greater than that of
Litvack and Nunis, though the nature of that benefit-director
276 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359.
277 See id.
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fees versus employment compensation-is different. On the
other hand, the relationship between Nunis, Litvach, and Eisner
is more direct and ongoing. Eisner is Litvack's and Nunis'
boss. 281 Eisner was at one time a consumer of services provided
by the establishment that employed Bowers, though he is also
critical of Bowers' longevity on the board. This last point might
carry little weight if one applies the rule against speculation.
Chancellor Chandler, however, also reminded us that while
analysis must avoid speculation, it must engage the subjective.
The allegations alone may very well establish the reasonable
inference that Bowers' position on the board was subject to the
will of Eisner and that retaining that position and its benefits
was subjectively so important to Bowers that she might question
whether she could "consider the corporate merits of the
challenged transaction objectively. 28 2
In any case, however, this analysis demonstrates the
difficulties with the simplistic application of the presumption in
Grobow v. Perot28 3 that the receipt of directors' fees, without
more, does not establish a financial interest. First, reliance on
Grobow is entirely misplaced. No one had suggested that Bowers
was interested in the transaction directly, so application of a rule
of presumption with respect to interest analysis seems
inappropriate. 28 4  The issue was domination, not interest.
Second, even if one could export the Grobow presumption to the
context of domination analysis, it provides little help to support a
determination of independence. The issue was not the interest in
the directors' fees but rather whether, under the circumstances of
such payment, just as under the circumstances of the
employment compensation to Litvack and Nunis, the connection
between Bowers, Eisner, and the directors' fees would make it
reasonable to believe that Bowers would vote based on Eisner's-
rather than Disney's-interests. 285 The Chancellor thus appears
to be weak on both the law and the facts.
A strong case can be made for the opposite result, however,
by ignoring Grobow and the Chancellor's analysis of Litvack and
Nunis and applying the analysis the Chancellor employed to test
281 See id. at 356.
282 Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002).
283 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
284 On this point, see Chancellor Chandler's own analysis. Id. at 26-31.
285 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 356.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.79:1011
the independence of Walker, O'Donovan, and Poitier. 28 6 Like
Walker, O'Donovan, and Poitier, Bowers enjoys no current ordirect connection with Eisner other than perhaps a personal one,
though such speculation is subject to the rule against
speculation. 237 The Eisner children no longer attended Bowers'
elementary school, and there is no evidence that other Eisner
children planned to attend the school at the time the
Employment Agreement was reviewed by the board.288 Bowers
and Eisner did not enjoy numerous political and financial
dealings, and, thus, there appears to be no quid pro quo. On the
other hand, Cardon Walker and Poitier are each financially
independent and hardly affected by either the receipt of director's
fees or the threat of removal from the Disney board. 289
O'Donovan takes no fees and is prominent in the academic field
as a president of major university. 290 In contrast, Disney board
membership is probably both financially and socially much more
important to Bowers. Perhaps Bowers is more like Wilson's wife
or Stern, but that analogy would require the Chancellor to treat
income from services for the company in the same way as fees
received for performing duties as a board member.
The preceding analysis illustrates the difficulties of theformalist, economic approach, even when attempting to apply it
on its own terms. The inherent contradictions of that analysis
and the analysis' utter failure in the face of competing policy-
often unwritten and not necessarily derived from legislative
pronouncements-make clear that the standard is of limited
value as the sole basis for dependency analysis in the context of
the duty of loyalty. Chancellor Chandler remained frustrated, to
some extent, by the consequences of this analytical framework.
He could not resist a swipe at the independence of the board even
as he held firmly to his original determination that the board was
not legally beholden to Eisner. "Eisner stacked his (and Iintentionally write 'his' as opposed to 'the Company's') board ofdirectors with friends and other acquaintances who, though not
necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more
willing to accede to his wishes and support him unconditionally
286 See id. at 358-61.
287 See id. at 359.
288 See id.
289 See id. at 358, 360-61.
290 Id. at 359.
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than truly independent directors.."291 But he stuck to his guns on
the domination issue suggesting that, though Eisner effectively
handpicked the directors among his friends and acquaintances,
and they might have been socially or morally beholden or more
amenable to influence by him as a result of their relationships,
Eisner's selections do not give rise to domination in a legal sense
under Delaware law.292 He grounded his view on the importation
in the domination context of what the Delaware Supreme Court
had suggested in the fiduciary duty context in deciding Brehm-
namely, that there is a big difference between "best practice" or
moral duty and the legal requirements of Delaware law.
293
Reality, in a sense, has less than optimal connections with legal
consequence because legal consequence must be constructed from
deductions realized within a much narrower framework of facts.
Yet, it seems that the Chancellor sacrificed a tremendous
amount in his efforts, paralleling those of the Supreme Court, to
implement somehow a moral-legal division in domination
analysis. With consistency sacrificed for the necessities of
policies, or to avoid the creation of particular presumptions, the
"facts and circumstances" analysis of the formalist economic
approach begins to resemble the sort of jurisprudence of personal
values decried in other areas of law. 294 Rather than focusing on
either facts or circumstances, the approach articulated and
applied by the Chancellor might serve to construct a reality
closer to common understanding. 295 This reality must necessarily
embrace presumptions of race, gender, and class through which
now more relevant facts can be sieved. Indeed, the analysis of
the Chancellor, taken in the aggregate, begins to suggest the
application of a set of presumptions with significant legal effect.
291 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 1875804,
at *40 (Del. Ch., Aug. 9, 2005).
292 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 361.
293 See id. at 361-62 (describing how the Disney board's duty of care was still
satisfied under Delaware law despite the fact that the board did not have knowledge
of the exact payout amount).
294 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the dormant commerce power jurisprudence);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a constitution is not intended to protect a specific economic model).
295 In another context, Judge Posner has raised similar concerns. He noted that
"the 'facts and circumstances' of each case ... is no standard at all, and makes the
tax status of charitable organizations and their donors a matter of the whim of the
IRS." United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999).
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These presumptions are not those the Chancellor sought to
avoid-that is, presumptions relating to the consequences of
particular economic and non-economic relationships between
directors. Rather, these presumptions center on the
consequences of gender, race, and class for dependence. As
applied to this case, these presumptions suggest a troubling
aspect of any fact-based independence analysis in the form
currently practiced by the courts.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT REVETA BOWERS: THE "REGULAR FOLKS"
EXCEPTION TO CHALLENGES TO INDEPENDENCE
Of all of the directors whose independence is challenged, only
Bowers' independence is affected by the size of the fees she
earned as a director. Her relatively modest circumstances make
her unique among the directors. For Disney, Litvack, and Nunis,
dependence was grounded in their salaries as officers of
Disney.296  For Gold, dependence was grounded in his
employment relationship with Roy Disney. 297  For Stern,
Mitchell, Walker, Poitier, and Wilson, dependence was
predicated on the receipt of fees for personal consulting under
contracts between them and Disney, Eisner, or Ovitz (or entities
with which they were involved), or for fees generated by their
firms or spouses for services to Eisner or Disney. 298  For
O'Donovan, dependence was grounded in the power of donation
to the institution he headed.299 For Russell, the allegation of
dependence was based on his personal employment by Eisner. 300
But money is money; it should tend to corrupt the same way
no matter what its source. 301 As such, the fact that the receipt of
money derived from and was perhaps dependent on the
continued good will of Eisner should support the application of
296 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 357.
297 See id.
298 See id. at 357-58, 360-61.
299 See id. at 359.
300 See id. at 360.
301 Some have argued that director compensation especially creates the sort of
corrupting financial incentives that make independence impossible and might, in
that sense, account for the scandals of the first few years of the twenty-first century.
See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law:
Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1605-07
(2002) (pointing out that director financial conflicts of interest arose from the size of
the compensation packages offered to directors).
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the "relative size matters" principle, especially when coupled
with the significance of the social benefit to the Disney Board of
Directors from Bowers' social position in Los Angeles had she not
been a member of the Disney board-although this inference is
subject to the limitation of the no-speculation rule.30 2 In this
sense, there should be nothing special about receiving funds
when serving as a director which would insulate this transaction
from other financial arrangements.
Yet there appears to be something special about being a
director, especially when directorships mix with "regular
folks."30 3 In this context, the general or even the contextual rules
of director independence are to be suspended. In their place, the
Chancellor would impose a new presumption-the "regular folks"
presumption of director independence, or the rule of ingratitude
and personal disloyalty. People of modest means may not be
presumed to be dependent on the people who made social,
financial, or other great rises in status possible and can never be
presumed to be beholden to such people, absent direct proof of a
specific quid pro quo transaction. The financial formalism of the
Chancellor's analysis, so rigorously applied to this point,
evaporates in the midst of social engineering. Two rules emerge
from the Disney analysis: One applies to the well off and the
other to the rest of us. It is to the assumptions underlying this
presumption and their consequences that we turn next.
A. The Presumptions of the "Regular Folks" Standard and the
Real Reveta Bowers
The "regular folks" presumption suggests an exception to the
notions of economic rationality that form the basis of much of
Delaware corporate law. On the one hand, it might suggest that,
at some level of income, people no longer articulate economic best
interests or wealth maximization in the same way as people with
greater wealth. In essence, "regular folks" are not subject to the
same calculation sets as are the wealthier among us, and thus,
the rules of fiduciary duty ought not to apply to them in the same
way. But that cannot be right. It suggests that Delaware
corporate law, and the policy underlying its interpretation, was
developed to apply only to people of a certain socio-economic
302 See supra Part I.C.4.c.
303 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
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status. Its policies, presumptions, articulations, and
implementations are based on a unique values set-unique, that
is, to people occupying a certain socio-economic position-and
meant solely to maximize those values.3 04 Exceptions, then, have
to be created for the odd circumstance of people who, in a position
304 For the view from popular culture, see THOMAS J. STANLEY, ACCORDING TO
THE MILLIONAIRE MIND (2004). A popularizing presence on the Internet, Mark
Skousen described the perspective underlying this idea in this way:
Here are the results of [Thomas J. Stanley's] survey of over 1,000 super-
millionaires (people who earn $1,000,000 a year or more):
* They live far below their means, and have little or no debt. Most pay off
their credit cards every month; 40% have no home mortgage at all.
* Millionaires are frugal; they prepare shopping lists, resole their shoes,
and save a lot of money; but they are not misers; they live balanced lives.
* 97% are homeowners; they tend to live in fine homes in older
neighborhoods. (Only 27% have ever built their "dreamhome.")
* 92% are married; only 2% are currently divorced. Millionaire couples have
less than one-third the divorce rate of non-millionaire couples. The typical
couple in the millionaire group has been married for 28 years, and has
three children. Nearly 50% of the wives of the super-rich do not work
outside the home.
* Most are one-generation millionaires who became wealthy as business
owners or executives; most did not inherit their wealth.
* Almost all are well educated; 90% are college graduates, and 52% hold
advanced degrees; however, few graduated top of their class-most were
"B" students. They learned two lessons from college: discipline and
tenacity.
* Most live balanced lives; they are not workaholics; 93% listed socialiazing
[sic] with family members as their #1 activity; 45% play golf. (Stanley
didn't survey whether they were avid book readers-too bad.)
* 52% attend church at least once a month; 37% consider themselves very
religious.
* They share five basic ingredients to success: integrity, discipline, social
skills, a supportive spouse, and hard work.
* They contribute heavily to charity, church and community activities
(64%).
* Their #1 worry: taxes! Their average annual federal tax bill: $300,000.
The top 1/10 of 1% of U.S. income earners pays 14.7% of all income taxes
collected!
* "Not one millionaire had anything nice to say about gambling." Okay, but
his survey also showed that 33% played the lottery at least once during the
year!
Thus, we see how the super upper-income families of this nation are not the
ones contributing to crime, welfare, divorce, child abuse, and a spendthrift
society. But they are playing [sic] a lot of taxes and making a lot of
contributions to solve these social problems.
Mark Skousen, Yes, The Rich Are Different-They're Better (March 2000),
http://www.mskousen.com/Books/Articles/richbetter.html.
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well above their social or economic station, occupy positions that
the law treats as reserved for others. But the presumption
implies that "regular folks" are more impervious to the influence
of money than are the economically well off. That is, had Bowers
been wealthier or in a higher status occupation, then she would
have been much more tempted by money and much more subject
to the influence of the person who made the money and status
possible than she was as an elementary school principal.
Perhaps lower socio-economic status makes one more virtuous in
the face of temptation, but I doubt it. To shield the "regular
folks" from the functioning of the standards of duty applicable to
everyone else seems a bit strained as well as an oddity of
Delaware law.
To get a sense of the way these presumptions work, we
return to Reveta Bowers. To revert to Reveta Bowers, of course,
is to reject, at least in part, the tendency of corporate law to
engage in abstraction and stereotype. That rejection necessarily
embraces an essentially feminist methodology. 30 5 And in what
better circumstance to invoke a feminist methodology than in the
context of an analysis of the construction of a woman in the
corporate law area of director independence.
These presumptions and their operation, however, have
more to do with Bowers as a construct of stereotype than as a
living being. Who is Reveta Bowers? First, it helps to see the
person beyond the abstraction of either the plaintiffs' argument
or Chancellor Chandler's analysis.
30 6
305 As Theresa Gabaldon has explained:
As a practical matter, feminism's struggle with abstraction is
unavoidable. First and foremost, the tendency toward abstraction inheres
in human thought processes and attempts to communicate. To compound
the difficulty, as relative newcomers, feminists must grapple with existing
philosophies and social institutions, including the law. Accordingly, a
significant part of the feminist endeavor is the attempt to relate women's
experience to various bodies of thoughts and principles worn smooth
through the passage of time.
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and
Securities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5 (1995).
306 Both Feminist and Critical Race Theories remind us that subordination and
abstraction are possible, in part, because of the power to obliterate the narrative and
image of "others." For a discussion, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1491-97 (2005). See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing
the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991). The litigation reduced Bowers to an
economic abstraction, but that was only part of the picture. Bowers' position was
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A native of Los Angeles, Reveta Franklin Bowers 307 has been
the Head of School at the Center for Early Education since
1976.308 In 2004, her compensation for this position was
$231,525.309 The Center for Early Education is an "independent
coed day school" for pre-school through sixth grade students of
differing ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. 10 It is also the
same elementary school that Michael Eisner's children once
attended.311 "A recognized leader in her field, Ms. Bowers has
served as President of the California Association of Independent
Schools and Treasurer of the National Association of
Independent Schools."312  "The National Association of
Independent Schools acts as the national voice of independent
pre-collegiate education and as the center for collective action on
behalf of its membership. '" 313 "It serves and strengthens its
member schools and associations by articulating and promoting
high standards of educational quality and ethical behavior by
working to preserve their independence to serve the democratic
society. . . and by advocating broad access for students in
affirming the principles of equity and justice."314 She is also a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Educational Records
Bureau, Inc.,315 and a member of the Board of Governors of the
Fulfillment Fund,316 a not-for-profit organization dedicated to the
also, to some extent, defined by both the way she was gendered and raced. Both
played a significant role in defining the nature and limits of her relationships
generally and on the Disney Board in general. See discussion infra Part II.B.
307 For a picture of Ms. Bowers, see California Community Foundation, Board of
Governors-Reveta Bowers, http://www.calfund.org/3/governors 3.4_bowers.php
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
308 Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Jan. 4, 2002),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.cominvestors/proxy/proxy-2002.pdf.
309 Charity Navigator, Charity Navigator Rating-Center for Early Education,
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/search.summary/orgid/7465.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005).
310 Id.
311 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del.Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
312 California Community Foundation, supra note 307.
313 National Association of Independent Schools, Mission Statement,
http://www.nais.org/about/article.cfm?ItemNumber=146190 (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
314 Id.
315 EDUC. RECORDS BUREAU, 2004-05 MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY (2004),
available at www.erbtest.org/media/2004-05%2oMembership%2ODirectory%204_4.
05.pdf.
316 See Fulfillment Fund, Board of Governors, http://www.fulfillment.org/
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education, support, and betterment of disadvantaged students. 317
Bowers is also "a director of several other not-for-profit
educational organizations, including Independent Educational
Services, a firm that assists independent schools in recruiting
teachers and administrators."318 She is also a trustee for the
Council for Spiritual and Ethical Education. 319 "[The Council for
Spiritual and Ethical Education] is a broad consortium of schools
committed to [] education for moral leadership and ethical
decision making[,] quality instruction about the world's religious
traditions[, and] spiritual growth in a religiously diverse
world."320 In addition, she is a member of the Respect for All
Project Advisory Board, 321 a media series designed to prevent
prejudice and violence and promote an appreciation of diversity
among elementary and middle school-age children.
322
In addition, "[Bowers] has been a trustee at Harvard
Westlake and Windward schools in Los Angeles, and is currently
on the boards of the Fulfillment Fund, the National Council for
Spiritual and Ethical Education, the Educational Records
Bureau, and the Brentwood School."3 23 "Ms. Bowers earned her
undergraduate and Master's degrees from the University of
Southern California, where she also completed three teaching
credentials" prior to her involvement in various organizations.
324
"Additionally, she was a Klingenstein Fellow at Columbia
University Teachers College in New York."325  "She and her
husband of more than 30 years, Superior Court Judge Bob S.
Bowers, have two adult children."326 One of her sons worked for
aboutuslboardofgovernors/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
317 See Fulfillment Fund, History, http://www.fulfillment.org/aboutushistory/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
318 Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 5 (Jan. 4, 2002),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.comlinvestors/proxy/proxy- 2OO 2.pdf.
319 See Matthew Hicks, Programs and Services, COUNCIL FOR SPIRITUAL &
ETHICAL EDUC. (Council for Spiritual & Ethical Education, Athens, Ga.)
available at http:/www.csee.org/news/article.asp?artkey=l13 (last visited Aug. 31,
2005).
320 Council for Spiritual and Ethical Education, http://www.csee.info/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2005).
321 Women's Educational Media, About The Respect for All Project,
http://www.womedia.org/respectforall.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
322 See id.
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the internet group of the Walt Disney Company during a portion
of 2001 and earned $81,863.327 At the time of the Ovitz affair
during 1995-1996, no other family member had been employed
by Disney. Reveta Bowers, who was on the board until 2002, was
not nominated for another term when her term expired in
2003.328
In 1996, a non-employee director of the Walt Disney
Company received a retainer fee based upon an annualized
amount of $30,000 together with a fee of $1,000 per board or
committee meeting attended.329 Non-employee directors had the
option to defer payment of all or part of their fees under the
Company's Deferred Compensation Plan for Outside Directors. 3 0
Such deferrals are generally until termination of the director's
service with the company or until he or she reaches a specified
age.331 Ms. Bowers participated in that plan, and it was effective
until she left the board. 332  In addition, each non-employee
director receives an automatic grant on March 1 of each year of
options to purchase shares of common stock.333 Each option
grant, vesting in equal installments over five years and having a
ten-year term, permits the holder to purchase shares at their fair
market value on the date of the grant.334 From September 30,
1997 to April 30, 1998 each non-employee director received
$30,000; after April, it was $35,000, plus a $1000 fee per board or
committee meeting.335  In 1998, each non-employee director
received $35,000 plus a $1000 fee per board or committee
meeting.3 36 In 1999, each non-employee director received $35,000
327 See Martin Arnold, Disney Admits Employing Directors' Children,
SRIMEDIA, Aug. 13, 2002, available at http://www.srimedia.com/artman/
publishlarticle_40.shtml. The employment of her son at Disney caused some trouble
for Bowers in 2002. Disney had apparently failed to disclose that three of their
independent directors-Reveta Bowers, Stanley Gold, and Raymond Watson-had
children employed at Disney. Under New York Stock Exchange Rules, none of these
directors could be considered independent. As a consequence, Reveta Bowers had to
give up her posts on the audit and compensation committees. See id.
328 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 7 (Jan. 28, 2003),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/proxy/proxy 2003.pdf.
329 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Feb. 25, 1997).
330 Id.
331 See id.
332 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Jan. 4, 2002).
333 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Jan. 4, 1999).
334 See id.
335 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 7 (Feb. 24, 1998).
336 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Feb. 23, 1999).
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plus a $1000 fee per board or committee meeting. 3 7 In 2000,
each non-employee director received $35,000, plus a $1000 fee
per board or committee meeting.338 In 2001, each non-employee
director received $45,000, plus a $1000 fee per board or
committee meeting.339 In 2002, each director received $45,000,
plus a $1000 fee per board or committee meeting. 340 Between
1996 and 2003, when she retired from the board, Bowers received
over $250,000 plus an extra $1000 for each meeting that she
attended.
What emerges is a very different-and far more complex-
picture than that painted by the Chancellor. In place of the
elementary school principal elevated well beyond her station in
life by a leading member of the American social aristocracy, we
confront a woman-an African-American woman-well-to-do and
well-integrated into the higher reaches of the social and political
hierarchies of Los Angeles, California. Michael Eisner himself
described Bowers as "one of the nation's leaders in primary
education [who] heads the Center for Early Education in Los
Angeles, an independent school for kindergarten through sixth
grade, which has been singled out as a model for its innovative
curriculum. Reveta helps us keep on top of the ever-changing
needs and interests of Disney's youngest fans."341  Bowers is
hardly one of the "regular folks" as the Chancellor suggested.
Now it is possible to construct a Bowers much more
amendable to influence by Eisner. How is that possible? That
construction can suggest greater rather than less independence-
well paid, well connected, and married to a spouse within the
legal elite of Southern California society. Yet it is this very
connectivity that makes Bowers far more vulnerable to influence
than had she been merely poor and dependent on her salary to
make ends meet. Like musicians and painters in eighteenth
337 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Jan. 4, 1999),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.comlinvestors/proxy/proxy-1999.pdf.
336 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 9 (Jan. 5, 2000),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/proxy/proxy_2000.pdf.
339 See Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 9 (Jan. 12, 2001),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/proxy/proxy_2001.pdf.
340 The Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 8 (Jan. 4, 2002),
available at http://corporate.disney.go.com/investors/proxy/proxy-2002.pdf.
341 Michael Eisner, Chairman & CEO, Walt Disney Company, Speech delivered
in Chicago, Illinois, (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.dlp.info/Guide/News-And-
Rumours/Archive/200O/Specials/EisnerO2.asp.
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century Europe,3 42 much of Bowers' success might be attributed
to patronage-and to the right kind of patronage. But patronage
comes at a price. To displease the patron, especially a powerful
one, might make it much more difficult either to replace the
patron or to operate in the social circle dominated by the patron
or those dependent on him. Bowers had a lot to lose and little to
gain by crossing Eisner or Ovitz. On the other hand, her very
connectivity to the community, and at the highest social and
economic levels, would make it possible for Bowers to retain her
independence. Her connections to the web of non-governmental
organizations and her spouse's connection to the legal community
suggest that even were Eisner to retaliate against her by
engaging in a concerted vendetta against her among the elite
community in which she operates, Bowers would not necessarily
be affected by any pressure that Eisner could bring to bear.
There are many people at Eisner's level in Los Angeles. Several
of these might be competing with Eisner for influence and status
in the social world which they inhabit. Should Bowers displease
Eisner, Bowers might easily find other patrons. Indeed, given
the nature of her work, it behooves Bowers to avoid capture by
any one patron. Thus, it is unlikely that Bowers would ever put
herself in a position of domination by a single patron on which
she and her organizational connections would be dependent.
But the opposite conclusion is possible when the analysis is
translated into the language of the Chancellor's analysis in
Disney using the framework to determine Father O'Donovan's
independence. In order to demonstrate dependence, plaintiffs
would have to show that Eisner either contributed to the
organizations important to Bowers, caused Disney to make
contributions to those organizations, or served on the board or in
another important capacity in any of those organizations. This
would serve as evidence of the 'numerous political and financial
dealings"' that seem to be a prerequisite for dependence under
Delaware law. 343 But, unlike O'Donovan, Bowers accepted the
substantial fees and other benefits of Disney board
342 Encyclopedia.com, Patron, http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/p 1/patron. asp
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
343 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see
also Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
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membership, 344 and board membership might have provided
Bowers with greater access to the sort of people essential for the
work in which she was engaged.
Ironically, the greatest pressure that Eisner could bring to
bear-the threat to ensure that Bowers was not re-nominated for
a position on the Disney board and therefore denied the financial
and other benefits of that position-brings us right back to the
Chancellor's purely economic analysis. 345 Unless money and
other financial benefits received by directors have a special
character and effect that distinguish them from money and other
benefits received by employees or agents for services rendered to
the corporation, then it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
the Disney director benefits are significant for Bowers. This
should be dispositive, even if it cannot be shown that status as a
director may also be of significant importance to Bowers given
her other work. To treat Bowers differently than Stern, Litvack,
or Nunis, without more, would be to engage in an unacceptably
arbitrary analysis.
But the formalistic analysis, heavily weighted to a
contextual economic analysis, should leave one unsatisfied.
Every resort to that sort of analysis tends to eviscerate critical
elements of the relationship between Eisner and Bowers and
between Bowers, Eisner, and the communities in which they
operate that contribute both to the artificiality and ultimately to
the arbitrariness of any conclusions based on such analysis.
Perversely, the social justice rhetoric behind which the
Chancellor hid seems even more necessary to a determination of
Bowers' independence. It is precisely because Bowers is neither
just "regular folks" nor independently wealthy that a
consideration of her economic and social class is so necessary to
determine independence. But in a society in which actual,
though not formal, authority is distributed on the basis of social
and economic class-the rich are more influential, better able to
protect themselves, and more independent than others-Bowers,
and everybody like Bowers, is more likely to become dependent
on Eisner than were she one of the poor. Bowers is engaged in
work that is heavily dependent on the funding and the goodwill
of people with large sums of wealth available for distribution to
344 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 359, 360.
345 See id. at 350-60.
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"worthy causes." There is a strong link of dependency between
donor and donee, despite the suggestion otherwise by the
Chancellor in the analysis of O'Donovan's independence. 346
Moreover, as the head of an institution catering to the wealthy,
she would be in no position to offend a leading member of elite
society on whose patronage her institution is dependent. Bowers
would have to calculate that any offense to Eisner would not
translate into shunning by others in order to remain impervious
to influence. In a very real and contextual way, Bowers remains
beholden to Eisner by the fact of her place in Los Angeles society.
In order to protect against this result, which merely applies the
consequences of the realities of American social and economic
organization, the Chancellor would have to create an exception to
the normal rules. This exception incorporates notions of
affirmative action into the corporate law of contextual action but
avoids discussion of the basis for its necessity. The "regular
folks" legal presumption is thus meant to overcome strong
cultural and economic presumptions-that the less powerful are
always beholden to the more powerful when they act in concert.
There is no independence within systems of hierarchy. In an
effort to do good, the Chancellor masks the justice element,
constructs it as a form of unspeakable artifice, and appears to
permit arbitrary results at odds to the basic policy of Delaware
corporate law, to ensure fair decisions by directors in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Does the more "realistic approach" urged on the
Chancellor 347 provide a better method for determining influence?
346 This dependence has been understood as a religious and cultural matter for
centuries in the West. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Medieval Poor Law in
Twentieth Century America: Looking Back Towards a General Theory of Modern
American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871 (1995) (addressing this issue).
347 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360. For purposes of this
Article, I will use the arguments developed by the Council of Institutional Investors
as set forth in their brief on appeal from the Delaware Court of Chancery to the
Delaware Supreme Court dated December 18, 1998, and revised December 29, 1998.
See Brief for the Council of Institutional Investors as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) [hereinafter "CII Amicus"].
The arguments parallel and apply the notions that would later find their way into
Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d
917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003), appeal denied, Oracle Corp. ex rel. Special Litig. Comm. v.
Barone, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003), summary judgment granted, In re Oracle Corp.,
Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005),
discussed supra notes 100-02. Both suggest the analysis later articulated by
Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of
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Perhaps a more realistic approach would make more sense. The
CII, as amicus, argued that CEOs, as a rule, "wield substantial
control over their corporations. '348 As such, a realistic approach
should include a presumption of CEO control.3 49 CII suggested
that any business relationship between a corporation and an
individual ought to create a presumption of domination by the
CEO. This presumption ought to apply to a number of different
sorts of relationships-from service as the company's outside
counsel to those "affiliated with one of the company's suppliers or
with a charitable organization that receives significant grants
from the company,"350 to those serving as employees of the
company.351
In sum, a director should be considered non-independent from
the company and its CEO whenever he/she has a nontrivial
connection to the company aside from his/her directorship.
Anyone with a nontrivial connection to the company is
necessarily beholden to the company and the CEO. To ignore
this reality is to perpetuate a legal fiction-that the interests of
the CEO and the corporation are somehow separable-that
disserves stockholders by encouraging judicial deference to
directors with conflicting interests.352
CII interposed a list of eight categories of relationships that
might be characterized as nontrivial for purposes of the
relational standard CII proposed. 353 Most of them systematize
Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the
Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 677-78 (2002); Margaret M. Blair
and Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
348 CII Amicus at 11.
349 "Of course, this is not the way corporations are supposed to work.
Nonetheless it is the way most of them do work, and the courts must take that fact
into account when considering the issue of director independence." Id.
350 Id. at 12.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 The categories include the following:
[1] where the director has been employed by the corporation or an affiliate
in an executive capacity; [2] where the director is, or in the past two years
has been, an employee or owner of a firm that is one of the corporation's or
its affiliate's or the CEO's paid advisors or consultants; [3] where the
director is employed by, or has a five percent or greater ownership interest
in, a significant customer or supplier; [4] where the director is employed by,
or has a five percent or greater ownership interest in, a debtor or creditor of
the corporation if the amount owed exceeds 1% of the corporation's or the
third party's assets; [5] where the director has, or in the past two years has
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and broaden current juridical approaches. The difference is that
while the existence of these relationships does not necessarily
create a presumption of domination under current law, without
quid pro quo evidence, under the CII version, each of them give
rise to such a presumption of domination.
At first blush, it does not appear that Bowers' relationship
with Eisner or Disney fits into any one of the relational
categories that CII suggested merits a presumption of
domination. CII, however, argued that Bowers ought to be found
interested in any case. First, CII argued that it was not clear
whether Eisner or Disney in fact had made significant
contributions to non-profit organizations on which Bowers served
as an officer or director. 354 In particular, CII alleged that given
Eisner's usual behavior patterns and his wealth, it would be
reasonable to suspect that he might have made significant
contributions to the school where his children received their
primary education.355 More interesting, and odd, was CI's other
argument: "Bowers lacks independence because her directors'
fees and stock options represent a substantial portion of her
income." 356 CII obliquely acknowledged that director fees were
not included within CII's own definition of nontrivial
relationships-but they appeared willing to make an exception in
Bower's case: Even if directors' fees could not be considered for
purposes of determining domination, "they should at least be
considered as part of the mix of information that may lead to a
finding of non-independence." 357
With this argument, we appear to be back where Chancellor
Chandler started. The standards-in this case, even CII's
had, a personal services contract with the CEO, the corporation or one of its
affiliates; [6] where the director is employed by, or serves as an officer or
director of, a non-profit corporation, foundation, university or other
organization that receives significant grants or endowments from the
corporation or one of its affiliates; [7] where the director is a relative of an
executive of the corporation or one of its affiliates; [8] where the director is
part of an interlocking directorate in which the CEO or other executive
officer of the corporation serves on the board of another corporation that
employs the director.
Id. at 14-15.
354 Id. at 30.
355 See id. at 30 ("Eisner's personal ties to that school raise at least a spectre
that such contributions, and potentially significant ones in light of Eisner's personal
wealth, have been made.").
356 Id. at 29.
357 Id. at 29-30.
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relational standards-do not seem to embrace the circumstances
that "reality" suggests should be important in determining
domination. The solution, CII would argue, requires throwing
the "fact" of director compensation into the stream of facts
flowing from Disney and the directors and seeing where these
facts take us. If the result of that factual cocktail "sort of/kind of'
looks like a nontrivial relationship-even if it is not a nontrivial
relationship-then it ought to be treated as one and Bowers
found dominated. Unfortunately, this approach seems to suffer
from the very deficiencies-indeterminacy, arbitrariness, and
unpredictability-that CII argued was at the foundation of the
deficiencies of Delaware's more narrowly applied standard. CII
was essentially attempting to fit the facts to a conclusion it
wished to draw-proceeding from the end rather than from the
beginning of its analytical framework, and modifying that
standard to meet its ultimate goal.
CII's own arguments about the reasons that its standard
ought to apply to Bowers, even though the standards are in fact
inapplicable, suggest a broader problem-the standards
themselves. CII sought to define domination by reference to
relationship, but it limited its relationship analysis-and the
standard derived thereby-to formal economic and financial
relationships. Yet at the same time it recognized that at least
other factors may be important for constructing that "mix of
information" necessary to determine domination in fact!
358
Chancellor Chandler's solution to this problem was to attempt
the crafting of a "regular folks" presumption. 359 CII's solution
was to propose a standard that appears to be flexible enough to
be abandoned when inconvenient in favor of a system of
"knowing" unconnected to any articulated standard.
360
Like Chancellor Chandler, CII's relational and more realistic
analysis is limited by a single-minded focus on economics and
finance. Reframed as a sophisticated application of a "structural
bias" analysis, it suffers from the deficiencies that the Delaware
Supreme Court would find troubling in Beam: a presupposition
that "the professional and social relationships that naturally
develop among members of a board impede independent
358 See id.
359 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 360 (Del.Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
360 See CII Amicus at 29-30.
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decisionmaking."3 61 CII's reliance on that sort of normative basis
for its standard results in an evisceration of critical elements of a
relationship between Eisner and Bowers and between Bowers,
Eisner, and the communities in which they operate that
contributes both to the artificiality and ultimately to the
arbitrariness of any conclusions based on such analysis.
Perversely, the economic class arguments of CII essentially
positing that Bowers is just not wealthy enough to resist the
corruptive effects of a large director's salary, and that, indeed, no
person of Bowers' economic class could resist such temptation 62
seems even more necessary to a determination of Bowers'
domination than arguments based on relationships. To find that
Bowers dominated, a status analysis must be substituted for a
contextual relationship analysis. Again, Bowers would have to
be reconstructed as a product of a narrow stereotype based on a
limited and generalized set of facts that may, in reality, have
little to do with Reveta Bowers as a living person. It seems that
both the Chancellor and CII embraced the same pattern of
thinking, employing different frameworks to reach opposite
conclusions. In both cases, their respective constructions of
Reveta Bowers served as a substitute for the facts and
circumstances of Bowers' real lived experience. Again, we find
ourselves in search of a fair and realistic standard to judge
domination and to protect shareholders.
B. What Do Race, Gender, and Class Have to Do With It?
Under the Chancellor's "regular folks" presumption, Reveta
Bowers remains an abstraction, substantially removed from her
lived reality. CII's more realistic approach does a better job of
getting to the aspects of the relationship between Bowers and
Eisner that touch most materially on the question of domination
and control by looking at the framework of formal relationships
between them. But neither completely gets to the heart of an
appropriate application of the independence standard. Under
361 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040 (Del. 2004). But CII goes farther, suggesting a structural bias analysis that
encompasses all relationships that may find a nexus within the context of
decisionmaking on the board of directors. At the same time, CII suggests that this
structural bias is at its most potent in connection with economic relationships, a
substantially more limited approach than that at issue in Beam, Oracle, or J.P.
Morgan.
362 See CII Amicus at 29-30.
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both standards, the reality of Bowers and her relationship with
Eisner gets lost in the construction of consequential facts from
the presumptions built into legal standards.
363
Chancellor Chandler's analysis serves as a powerful
illustration of the problem with the Delaware approach-it starts
from the presumption that no relationship with an interested
person, on its own, taints independence and then crafts a series
of exceptions to that rule based on presumptions relating to
human nature in the face of financial temptation. But as
Chancellor Chandler's difficulties with Bowers also
demonstrated, this standard tends to work best in abstraction
and does a court little good when faced with the realities of the
power of relationships outside of the context of pure economics
and finance.
CII starts from almost the opposite position: Every
relationship with an interested person taints independence and
then crafts a series of limiting principles based on presumptions
relating to human nature in the face of financial temptation.
But, as CI's own arguments in Disney highlight so well, this
standard also tends to work best as abstraction and requires
virtual abandonment when faced with the realities of the
consequences of hierarchy and subordination in the United
States.
The parallelism of the two approaches helps explain the ease
with which CII could maintain that people who are economically
or socially subordinate to others are necessarily dominated by
their economic or social "superiors" as a matter of law364 and the
felt necessity on the part of Chancellor Chandler for the creation
of a legal presumption against the application of this cultural
understanding. 365 Faced with issues touching on domination,
subordination, and hierarchy, neither standard was up to the
task of realistically or fairly incorporating factual reality into
legal analysis. Both standards are thus confounded by the
363 On the utility of this approach for the purpose of constructing a culturally
significant fictive "factual" picture of an object to which the law is applied, without
regard for the reality underlying the fiction created over generations of judicially
constructed factual portraits, see Backer, Tweaking Facts, supra note 50.
364 This was essentially the core of CI's argument to the Delaware Supreme
Court in Brehm. See CII Amicus at 29-30.
365 This was the essence of the foundation for the Chancellor's construction of a
"regular folks" presumption, essentially denying legal effect to a socially accepted
reality. See id. at 24.
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realities of disparity-ostensibly just economic and social
disparity-which American political theory tells us ought not to
make a difference but which economic theory tells us makes all
the difference in the world. At the same time, both approaches
mask the realities of other disparities-Reveta Bowers is both
woman and African American. Faced with a triple set of
hierarchies and consequential domination, both standards
ignored two and attempted to mask the third.366
All the same, the Chancellor's "regular folks" standard opens
a very interesting door. Likewise, CII's factual mixture standard
provides a procedural door to a fairer standard. It might make
sense to explore what might lie on the other side of those
openings. Chancellor Chandler tells us that the public policy of
Delaware requires the corporate law, and particularly the law of
fiduciary duty, to be developed in a manner that serves larger
goals. His presumption is that social equality is a fundamental
value to which the fiduciary duty law of Delaware must give
way.367 That presumption upends the traditional Delaware
approach to fiduciary duty as developed in the cases. 368 It seems
to place social and political issues over the more narrow issues of
efficiency within the firm or to recognize Reveta Bowers as an
individual with a unique relationship to Disney and Eisner
precisely because she is Reveta Bowers and not an abstraction.
CII may see Reveta Bowers as well but from another angle. But
CII seeks to neutralize the uniqueness that brings Bowers to the
Disney board and, by reducing her to an abstract representative
of social class, reduce her individuality to insignificance.
Race and gender do play something of a role in the
discussion of Bowers among the few academics that took the time
to notice her. Susan Estrich 36 9 uses Bowers as an example of the
difficulties African Americans face in trying to break into the
American economic elite-a class that remains "overwhelmingly
366 As we have seen, it is not all that clear that Bowers was "regular folk" as
most Americans would understand that term. See supra Part II.A.
367 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 360 (Del.Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). ("[T]odo so would be to discourage the membership on corporate boards of people of less-
than extraordinary means."):
368 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979); Grobow v. Perot,
539 A.2d 180, 185 (Del. 1988); Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL
441999, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995).
369 ESTRICH, supra note 40, at 86-89.
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white, male, and Protestant, even though individual women,
blacks, and Hispanics have gained entree.''370 The analysis,
however, does little more than provide anecdotal evidence of
"how difficult it is for African-American women to get tapped to
positions of power on corporate boards."371 There is no purported
connection between race, gender, and application of corporate
legal standards. Should there be?
Science is only now beginning to understand what
subordinated groups have understood implicitly:
Recent social cognition research has provided stunning
evidence of implicit bias against various social categories. In
particular, it reveals that most of us have implicit biases
against racial minorities notwithstanding sincere self-reports to
the contrary. These implicit biases have real-world
consequence-in how we interpret actions, perform on exams,
interact with others, and even shoot a gun.
372
Modern Critical Race and Feminist theorists, it seems, would
have provided the Chancellor with greater insight regarding both
the futility in, and consequences of, embracing the sort of
neutral, formalistic, economics-only approach he desired.
373
Dominance and subordination analysis, which has been one of
the great objects of study of modern Feminist and Critical Race
scholars, has slowly begun to be applied to the study of the
corporate law.374 The collateral effects of corporate law norms on
370 Id. at 81.
371 Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Review Essay, The Power Pyramid, 24 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 207 n.28 (2003) (reviewing ESTRICH, supra note 40). "She also
praises the head of the independent school her children attend, Reveta Bowers, and
points out that Bowers is the only African-American woman on Disney's
board.... She points out that Michael Eisner's children attended the same school as
Estrich's, and he, too, was impressed with Bowers." Id.
372 Kang, supra note 306, at 1490.
373 On the difficulty of communication between Critical Race and Feminist
scholars on the one hand and the bench on the other, see Larry CatA Backer,
Defining, Measuring, and Judging Scholarly Productivity: Working Toward a
Rigorous and Flexible Approach, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 322-25 (2002), suggesting
that there are special problems with communication and recognition for fields of
scholarship that have not been generally accepted within the legal academic
community-particularly, Critical Race Theory and Feminist writings.
374 There have been myriad recent works in this area, touching on issues of
corporate social responsibility, fiduciary duty, and discrimination. See generally
Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and Corporate Law Firms, 77
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 785 (2003) (discussing the problems that exist for minority
associates working in corporate law firms and describing the implications of anti-
discrimination laws on employment discrimination); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
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gender, race, and racial justice issues have also been explored. 375
"The law pertaining to corporations is not limited to the
shareholder wealth principle or even to internal corporate
governance rules, but also includes broader "noncorporate" laws,
such as Title VII, that are expressly based on values other than
shareholder wealth."376
Today, however, this sort of approach is not likely to garner
substantial political support. "In the current political climate,
there is a cost to openly embracing a racial justice agenda."377
Chancellor Chandler may well have recognized this political
context when masking the social justice agenda of the "regular
guy" presumption within the discourse of shareholder
maximization-specifically, within the concept of "economic
rational actor," discourse traditional to the Delaware fiduciary
duty cases. For feminists, this masking may be necessary to, and
Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get
There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2004) (analyzing the relationship betweenbusiness law and Critical Race Theory with respect to the corporate advancement ofdifferent racial types); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White
Man's Burden, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 944 (2002) (opining on the subjects of race
and sex and their respective relationships to corporate decision-making); Emily M.S.Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003) (arguing
that courts should use the doctrine of good faith in contract law to prohibit improper
considerations of race in contract formation and should recognize good faith as adevice for eliminating racial subordination in the workplace); Thomas W. Joo, A Trip
Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy" Shareholder Voice and Management
Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735 (2003) (exploring the intersection between
race and corporate law-specifically, the lack of diversity in the ranks of corporate
executives); Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VI, 6 MICH. J.RACE & L. 127 (2000) (assessing the diversity initiatives of the leading edge of
corporate America under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Cheryl L. Wade,Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race
Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461 (2002) (examining persistent racial
discrimination in large, publicly held corporations).
375 See Larry Cati Backer, The Duty to Monitor: Emerging Obligations of
Outside Lawyers and Auditors To Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond
the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 919, 931-37 (2003) (discussing
the amendments to federal securities laws mandating outside auditors and counsel
to seek out and report corporate misconduct including violations of anti-
discrimination laws). See generally Gabaldon, supra note 305 (indicating that
Feminist Theory is, itself, shaped by experiences).
376 Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 351, 363 (2004). Joo goes on to comment: "Rather than focusing on reconciling
themselves to shareholder value discourse, commentators on race and corporate law
should point out that it is not the only valid discourse, even in the corporate arena."
Id.
377 Id. at 364.
1082 [Vol.79:1011
2005] RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND DISNEY-OVITZ
certainly does not change the character of, any action undertaken
within its framework. As Claire Moore Dickerson has nicely
explained:
Those who have supported fiduciary duty track the three
feminist approaches highlighted by Hilary Charlesworth: (1) we
sound like liberal feminists when we strive for equality by
discounting differences between those with power and those
without it; (2) we sound like cultural feminists when we
celebrate the different experiences and perspectives of the
powerful and the vulnerable; (3) we sound like radical feminists
when we assert that we must correct the power imbalances
inherent in the existing structures.
378
Thus, Chancellor Chandler's attempt to incorporate economic
justice principles into Delaware fiduciary duty law is striking for
its parallels to cultural feminist approaches.
This masking, however, is not cost free, nor is it free from
dangers of its own. As we have seen, Disney well illustrates the
trouble with cloaking diversity policy in the neutral language of
economics. 379  In reducing Bowers to a socio-economic
abstraction, the Chancellor stripped her of her gender and race.
That stripping denied her the value of her socio-cultural
uniqueness. It is the recognition of this bundle of unique
characteristics that would have better served the Chancellor in
weighing facts and circumstances for the purpose of determining
the domination by, or independence from, Eisner. A gendered
and raced Bowers might have been understood to interact with
Eisner differently than a white person or male in the same
economic or social circumstances. It is this framework that
distinguishes a race- and gender-sensitive analysis from the
ostensibly neutral, but unrealistic approach of a generalizing,
formalist, economic analysis common to the law of fiduciary duty.
Ironically, in the context of the domination of Reveta Bowers,
the insights of Critical Race theorists are perverse:
Yet in America, even ... after much heralded reforms, CEOs of
publicly held companies get to pick their bosses-the board of
directors. As I have previously demonstrated, in corporate
America director elections resemble elections in Soviet Russia-
378 Claire Moore Dickerson, Feminism and Human Rights, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 139, 142 (2001).
379 See supra Parts LB-C (highlighting the problems and consequences of the
Chancellor's handling of the relevant racial and gender issues).
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there is only one candidate to vote for because generally only
management solicits proxies and SEC rules do not require the
inclusion of candidates running against management's
nominees. Given this power, it would be natural for a CEO to
select a board of directors comprised of the CEO's clones.
Certainly this would be a formula that would encourage
maximum, even excessive, pay and benefits for the CEO.
Instead, CEOs do the next best thing-they select their cultural
and demographic clones. This ... achieves the same outcome:
CEO power over board selection leads to enhanced
compensation of CEOs. 38 0
This suggests that the better presumption would be that
Bowers would had to have been dominated by Eisner. If Critical
Race theory's homo-social selection hypothesis is right,381 then
Reveta Bowers was chosen more because she resembled Eisner
than because she was different from him. It is hard to argue that
the real Reveta Bowers more closely resembled, both culturally
and demographically, Eisner than she did the stereotypical
"anyone else."38 2 Perhaps, then, the difference in socio-economic
status between Eisner and Bowers was intended to ensure
loyalty to the person doing the choosing.
Professor Ramirez, however, would suggest that this is not
the case. He would argue that the cultural distinctiveness
attaching to Bowers' racial assignment in American society,
along with the cultural attachments of class suggested by
Chancellor Chandler, would militate against cultural and
380 Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why
Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What To Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1583, 1590-91 (2004) (citing James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who
Shall Govern?: CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director
Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77-79 (1995)).
381 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89GEO. L.J. 797, 797 (2001) (indicating that invitations to be a board member arebased largely on matters of compatibility and "fit"); Wade, supra note 374, at 1469-
73 ('"White men are hired more easily, promoted more frequently, and paid more
than people of color and women because they are most similar to the white men who
make these corporate decisions.").
382 For a discussion of a related theme-namely, the power of group-
mindedness, or a process whereby persons adjust their behavior in response to theirimpressions of other group members to account for bad behavior, even among
independent members of a board of directors-see generally Marleen A. O'Connor,
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003).
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demographic cloning in Bowers' case. 38 3 But difference, again,
leads to perversity if the goal is to attain a policy objective of
inclusion. If Bowers was culturally distinct from Eisner, thus
adding value to Disney, there would appear to be a certain level
of independence. Cultural independence, though, produced little
more than business as usual on the board, at least in connection
with CEO compensation. Ironically, Bowers helped contribute to
a great enhancement of CEO compensation by first voting in
favor of the Employment Agreement and then doing little else to
limit the resort to the favorable termination provisions of the
Employment Agreement. In this sense, the homo-sociability of
Bowers appears more prominent than her cultural
distinctiveness.
Either way, both Critical Race and Feminist approaches add
an important element to any analysis of fiduciary duty, especially
to an analysis of independence-namely, a relational element.
This approach permits an "unpacking" of the social justice
exceptionalism endorsed by Chancellor Chandler, as well as the
social class exceptionalism of CII's realistic "relational" analysis.
The "regular folks" presumption can be better understood for
what it is-an attempt to extract and acknowledge the presence
of social and economic forces in any analysis of the effect of
relationships of dominance and independence. CI's
presumption, in the other direction, attempts the same. Both
ignore the flesh and blood people who are subject to their
authority and the foundation on which their relationships are
based. Both must do more. The "unpacking" must also extract
the effects of race and gender. All three operate with some
strength in defining the realities of the relationship between
383
Due to the cultural moorings of race, diverse board members bring enriched
perspectives to the boardroom with no offsetting diminution of merit,
defined in accordance with the institutional mission of the business. It is
not skin color or other morphological features traditionally associated with
race that gives rise to different and valuable experiences and insights;
rather it is cultural diversity that leads to cognitive skills that can and do
transcend race.
Ramirez, supra note 380, at 1588 (footnote omitted). Marleen O'Connor makes a
similar point in the context of the Enron scandal: "To assure more directors have the
'will to act,' the second proposal seeks to increase diversity on corporate boards by
appointing directors with 'outsider values.' By increasing diversity, this reform
reduces the existing homogeneity that can lead to groupthink." O'Connor, supra note
382, at 1241.
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Reveta Bowers and Michael Eisner. Race adds a layer of
complexity to the analysis. Gender adds another. It is time to
discuss both elements in a fact intensive legal context from which
a determination of domination can easily be ascertained. As
Cheryl Wade has reminded us, it is no longer enough to respond
to race and, to some extent, gender and social class with calls for
diversity or a resort to some other salve. 38 4 It is time to expose
all presumptions and, in such exposure, directly confront the
character of plaintiff or defendant, whether shareholder, director,
or officer. It is the nature of these individuals' relationships with
others that must be given significant legal effect.
Unlike Chancellor Chandler's social justice exceptionalism,
or CII's relational economic class presumptions, this approach
does not pre-judge the outcome of its analysis. The goal of this
method, as mentioned earlier, is to "unpack" presumptions rather
than build them up-an endeavor that must be pursued despite
any "worthy" reason for presumption the builder might proffer.
If we have gained nothing from the preceding analysis-if
Feminist and Critical Race Theory can teach us nothing else-
each can teach us this: presumptions tend to have unintended
effects that work to undercut, rather than further, the policy
goals they purport to advance. 38 5 The object must be to expose
the limitations of, and avoid easy resort to, pre-conceived short
cuts to conclusions about people or their actions.38 6
384 See Cheryl L. Wade, 'We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer": DiversityDoublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1545-46 (2004) (compelling managers to
affirmatively monitor compliance with anti-discrimination laws as opposed to merely
"talking" about efforts to diversify).
385 See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal
Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1583-86 (2004) (advising against reliance onpresumptions and generalizations in order to assess data and predict results).
386 Consequently, we must avoid making broad generalizations from a single,
discrete factual occurrence. Although the intention is to seek a reliable explanationfor, or prediction about, certain conduct, the risk of crossing the line into fiction orpresumption is much too high. This is precisely the problem with what theChancellor attempted through the creation of a "regular folks" presumption as alegal generalization of Bower's circumstances and with CI's attempt to do the same
through a factual mixture exception to its relational standard. See id. Mitchell
reminds us of the power of what Paul Meehl refers to as "fireside inductions," whichhe defines as 'common-sense empirical generalizations about human behavior
which we accept on the culture's authority plus introspection plus anecdotal
evidence from ordinary life."' Id. at 1540 n.63 (citing PAUL E. MEEHL, Law and theFireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, in SELECTEDPHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PAPERS 440, 440 (C. Anthony Anderson &
Keith Gunderson eds., 1991)).
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Whether Reveta Bowers would be more or less likely to be
deemed dominated under a more race/gender/social class
relational analysis is hard to say. But, again, that is not the
point. The construction of a standard heavily dependent on facts
and circumstances ought not be built to prejudge those facts or
factors. This is especially the case where those factors touch
upon race, gender, or social class. Chancellor Chandler and CII
both attempted to avoid pre-judgment but instead created or
applied standards that could not help but assume the answers to
their own questions. Both attempted to avoid race and gender by
focusing on social and economic class within a standard that
emphasizes wealth but not the social or economic consequences of
its disparities. Within the body of Reveta Bowers, however,
neither race nor gender can be avoided, nor should it have been
in determining her domination by Eisner-a proposition so
culturally loaded that, in this case, it could have cut both ways
given Bowers' position. Furthermore, social class analysis was
applied as an abstraction rather than a reality. The reality was
that Bowers was a well-off, economically successful African-
American woman whose work occurred at the higher levels of
American social organization. A determination of her domination
would require an analysis of the interaction between three
hierarchies of subordination and control-economic, racial, and
gender. In Bowers' case, it is not clear that the three all cut in
the same direction, but an analysis based on the combined
realities would have produced a better application of the rules
protecting shareholders against the actions of directors with
conflicts of interest. A more open, relational standard using
insights developed while theorizing about the sensitive issues of
subordination and fairness might produce fairer and more
realistic results.
38 7
C. A Suggested Approach to Independence/Domination Under
Delaware Law
It is easy enough to tear an opinion apart. Criticism,
especially academic criticism, carries little obligation, and no
387 Cf. Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom-For Whom?: Feminist Legal
Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 100-07
(2004) (discussing how a focus on Feminist ideals such as nurturing connectedness,
attending to context, and furthering equality and human flourishing could help a
corporation's social progression).
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consequence. This Article has suggested a different approach to
an analysis of director domination. The touchstone of this
approach should be subordination. Subordination would
encompass all hierarchical and affective relationships-from
economic relations (based on the power of one individual to affect
the employment status of another), to class relationships (thepower that relative wealth provides or denies), to race andgender subordination as actually demonstrable in any context ofboard of director action. Subordination should serve as a
substantive rule-subordination destroys all claims ofindependence. Subordination should also serve as a procedural
rule-establishment of a relationship of subordination ought to
shift the burden of proving independence from the plaintiff to thedirector seeking to establish independence for purposes of
validating board of directors' actions. That shifting of the burden
of proving independence ought to be triggered both by a showing
of a subordinate employee relationship with the dominating
person, but also on a showing that contractual or other
relationships may be affected by decisions made by thedominating party. Thus, for example, where the dominating
party controls contractual arrangements affecting a person,
whether or not with the company, ought to be sufficient to trigger
the shift in the burden. Control triggering the shift in theburden should extend not only to contracts between the person
whose independence is at issue, but also extend to contractual
relationships between the dominating person and employers of
that person, or the immediate family of that person, or companiesin which the affected person has an interest. Control sufficient to
shift the burden should also extend to contracts controlled by thedominating person whether or not with the company on whose
board the dominated person sits.
The point of subordination analysis is to unmask the
relationship of power, not to hide it through the creation of
artificial barriers to uncovering the nature of dependence in
relationships between people. As such, subordination analysis is
not "structural bias" by another name, nor is it merely another
way to apply Vice Chancellor Strine's Oracle analytic method.
The critical difference between subordination analysis and the
sort of approach of Vice Chancellor Strine in Oracle3S8 that
388 See discussion supra note 96-102.
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caused the Delaware Supreme Court such disquiet in Beam
38 9 is
the focus of the analysis on the realities of the power
relationships between the parties and the critical role of burden
shifting in independence analysis under the subordination
analysis.390 Independence may not be a function of friendship or
horizontal relationships-but it should be a function of power.
The object of a standard of independence based on the
application of subordination principles ought to have as its object
to ensure the legitimacy of board decisions by solidifying the
authenticity of "independent" decisions of the board. The result
might well be more cases in which there is insufficient board
independence to validate a board action absent shareholder
approval. But that, precisely should be the result. There is no
point establishing a complicated structure of independence,
vesting this structure with enormous power to validate corporate
action, and then to gut the substance of independence. To the
extent the courts have broadened the means by which the board
can produce a sufficient number of nominally "independent"
directors, they have facilitated board of directors action at the
price of legitimacy. Fewer but more soundly legitimate
independent decisions might produce fewer and less burdensome
litigation.
The value of this subordination based relational approach
might be measured, in part, by its utility in the sort of cases
heard by the chancery court. What might happen if the approach
I suggest-relational with a sensitivity to race, class, and gender,
were applied in the Disney case that has served as the object of
this Article? Could the Delaware courts, and corporate boards of
directors in general, live with the consequences? Let's see:
389 See discussion supra note 101.
390 Indeed, this burden shifting component was critical in the way the Supreme
Court was able to distinguish the result and analysis in In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003), appeal denied, Oracle Corp. ex
rel. Special Litig. Comm. v. Barone, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003), summary judgment
granted, In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872
A.2d 960 (Del. 2005) (shareholder litigation committee context) from a demand
futility context. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1054-55 (Del. 2004). Under a subordination analysis, the burden
shifting inherent in the shareholder litigation committee context would apply in all
contexts in which director independence is an issue.
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1. Michael Eisner
The chancery court focused on the economic value of theOvitz Employment Agreement and its effect on Eisner's stock
options. 391 Chancellor Chandler also rejected the legal effect ofthe very long friendship of Eisner and Ovitz.392 But neither the
chancellor nor the litigants thought to put the two ideas together.Ovitz's value to Eisner was based on their friendship and wouldincrease the value of Eisner's interest in Disney. But it would beEisner's interest in control of Disney rather than the short-term
value of his economic interest in Disney that would benefit mostfrom the arrangement. In this sense, subordination affectsEisner's interest in the transaction: he seeks to establish a
relationship of subordination based on friendship and the
establishment of a formal hierarchical relationship (for which the
subordinated party would be well paid) for the purpose of
advancing Eisner's control over Disney. Officers serve at thepleasure of the board of directors, not of one of the members of
the board. To the extent that Eisner wanted to put someone
under his control as President, Eisner was interested in the
transaction for personal reasons. The fact that the arrangement
never worked out should not be dispositive here. Class plays a
role here. Eisner is looking for a member of the same social,
cultural, and economic class to serve Eisner's interests in control
without challenging the values of Eisner.
2. Roy Disney
The chancery court focused on Roy Disney's wealth. TheChancellor's decision was grounded, to a large degree, on the
assumption that vast wealth insulates a person from corruption,
at least with respect to smaller amounts of wealth. But, as thefederal government successfully proved in the Martha Stewartlitigation, 393  that assumption is not necessarily either a
391 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 355-56 (Del. Ch.1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.2000).
392 Id. at 355.
393 Martha Stewart was successfully prosecuted for securities fraud involving anamount somewhere between $40,000 to $45,000, a very small sum compared to Ms.Stewart's wealth. It is possible, then, these types of securities fraud cases suggestthat even very wealthy people could be corrupted by relatively small sums. Theopposite presumption of the Delaware courts appears to run counter to emergingfederal practice. For a discussion of the Stewart case and a criticism of the federal
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reasonable or necessary assumption. Labor relationships create
a legally enforceable system of subordination for pay. Assuming
both the necessity and value of this system,
394 the hierarchical
relationship of employment ought to create a presumption of
dominance where one person in a work relationship has
authority over others. In such a case, the subordinate employee
ought to be considered non-independent unless the subordinate
employee can prove independence in fact.
However, in this case, Roy Disney might be able to show that
his interests were adverse to Eisner's and that he could assert
independent positions irrespective of his relationship of formal
subordination to Eisner. Disney could show the absence of
subordination in fact to Eisner by producing evidence that he
could act independently of Eisner. In this case, evidence used by
the chancery court to support its conclusion that Disney was
independent is useful. Roy Disney, the founder's nephew,
controlled a significant equity interest in the company. His
position as a large shareholder, in this case, would suggest an
interest independent of and potentially adverse from that of
Eisner, an officer and director (and less significant shareholder)
of the company. Relational analysis would serve to confirm
rather than challenge the conclusion reached by the Chancellor,
but would shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant because of the subordination inherent in the
relationship between Disney and Eisner as officers.
3. Sanford M. Litvak and Richard A. Nunis
Litvak and Nunis are not only directors, but also officers of
Disney. They report to Eisner. The chancery court determined
that no issue of independence was present because Eisner was
not interested. 95 Relational analysis would not change the
result but it would deepen the analysis. As with Roy Disney, the
fact that a relationship of subordination existed between Eisner
and Litvak and Nunis ought to be enough to establish a
practice on gender and other grounds, see Joan McLeod Hemingway, Save Martha
Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 
12
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (2003).
394 But see, in the American context of freed slaves of African descent, the essays
in FROM CHATTEL SLAVES TO WAGE SLAVES: THE DYNAMICS OF 
LABOUR
BARGAINING IN THE AMERICAS (Mary Turner, ed., 1995).
395 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 357.
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presumption of dominance. As a consequence, Nunis and Litvak
ought to have been required to produce evidence of theirindependence, rather than requiring the plaintiffs to produce
evidence of dependence. Here, a relational analysis based on
notions of subordination would reverse the current Delaware
approach to independence analysis.
4. Stanley P. Gold
The connection between Gold and Ovitz remains too tenuous,
and relational analysis also changes the result reached by the
chancery court. 396  It is true that Roy Disney, not Eisner,dominates Gold. The chancery court concluded that thisdomination has legal effect in connection with the Employment
Agreement only if Eisner dominates Disney.397 Even under a
relational standard it is possible but unlikely that Roy Disney
could not show his independence. Roy Disney may dominateGold, but because Eisner does not dominate Disney, then Gold'sdomination has no legal effect. But a relational standard based
on subordination should lead to a different result. Because Goldis dominated by Roy Disney, then any vote cast by Gold, whether
or not based on a direct interest in the transaction is notindependently cast. If Roy Disney's interest is adverse to Eisner,
and he casts his vote on that basis as a director (solely in the bestinterest of the corporation) then Roy Disney has done his duty.
But when Gold casts his vote, his intention is to serve the bestinterests of Roy Disney, rather than the company. That theCompany's best interests are also served is incidental. Gold's
vote, then, is tainted, precisely because he is dominated by
Disney, and as such, is incapable of independently voting theinterests of the corporation. He does not serve the body of
shareholders39s so much as he serves a single shareholder-Roy




398 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, supra note 97, § 8.30(a) ("Each member of the
board of directors ... shall act ... in a manner the director reasonably believes to bein the best interests of the corporation."). The Official Comment explains that theterm "corporation" "is a surrogate for the business enterprise as well as a frame of
reference encompassing the shareholder body." Id. at Official Comment Part 1.
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5. Robert A.M. Stern
The chancery court determined that Stern might not be
independent because of his connection to an architectural firm
that had collected millions of dollars in fees from Disney work
controlled by Eisner. The possibility of future work and its
magnitude played a critical role in that analysis.
399 Relational
analysis would change the result. The relationship of
dependence, plus its significance to Stern are sufficient to
suggest a temptation to please the person who controlled access
to work for the architectural firm. What relational analysis
might add would be that the scope of dependence is deeper than
the chancery court would concede. Eisner not only controlled
access to Disney work for Stern and his company; Eisner also
influenced Stern's access to other work. Eisner's influence, the
weight of his recommendations, and the status that high profile
projects gave to Stern's firm in seeking other work could make
the nature of the dependence much more complex. It also would
more firmly center that dependence on Eisner, rather than on the
company.
6. E. Cardon Walker
The chancery court found that Walker was independent of
Eisner.400 Walker was Eisner's predecessor at Disney-its former
president and chairman of the board of directors.
40 1 Walker had
a consulting arrangement with Disney. Relational analysis
would suggest that, to the extent that Eisner had power to
determine the amount of consulting paid for, as well as the
renewal of that contract, a relationship of subordination existed
between Walker and Eisner. As such, the burden should have
shifted to Walker to show independence. In this case that might
have been possible. The CII Amicus admits that Eisner had little
power to make determinations under the contracts, other than to
cause Disney to breach them.40 2 There was no indication that
Walker was seeking additional investment in Disney films (had
there been such attempts, it should be harder for Walker to
demonstrate independence, especially if Eisner influenced such
399 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 357.
400 Id. at 358.
401 See supra note 195.
402 CII Amicus at 27.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.79:1011
investment decisions).
7. Gary L. Wilson
The chancery court determined that Wilson was independent
for lack of a direct financial relationship with Eisner and bydiscounting the significance of Disney work awarded to his wife's
firm. 40 3 A relational analysis based on subordination principles
might produce a different result. Wilson's web of contractual andbusiness connections with Disney suggests the potential fordomination, and is significant enough to trigger a shift in theburden of showing independence. In this case, Wilson himself
might not be dependent on Eisner directly. But Wilson is
married to a person who may be dependent on Eisner in
significant ways. It is true that the value of the compensation toWilson's wife was small in relation to Wilson's wealth,404 but it
may be true that this compensation was significant in relation toWilson's wife's wealth, or her business's income, or her positionin her firm. To that extent, what should drive the subordination
analysis ought not to be the relationship of the spouse'sdependence based on the husband's wealth, but the spouse's
dependence based on her own position. Wilson may bedependent indirectly. The subordination of his wife to Eisner,
that is Eisner's control over what may be a significant part ofWilson's spouse's income or career, may make Wilson dependent
as well.
8. Leo J. O'Donovan
Father O'Donovan was deemed independent because he did
not receive money directly from Eisner or Disney, because the
chancellor could find no pattern of dealings between the two men,
and because Eisner did not sit on the board of Georgetown,
though Eisner did contribute heavily to Georgetown.45 A
relational analysis based on subordination might make this a
much closer question.
On the one hand, one could argue that there was no
subordination involved here-this was a relationship of equals
and thus a narrow economic analysis was appropriate. Eisner
403 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 358.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 359.
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had what O'Donovan needed for the institution he headed-
money. O'Donovan had what Eisner needed-conventional
respectability to give legitimacy to Disney cultural products for
sale on the market; O'Donovan presence could be said to serve as
a religious endorsement, or at least a religious voice in Disney's
activities, that was good for business. But horizontal
relationships already can produce dependence with consequences
under Delaware's independence standards. 40 6  What a
subordination based relational analysis suggests in this case is
that Chancellor Chandler drew the line too narrowly. At the
least, the allegation of an arguably horizontal and mutually
beneficial relationship between Eisner and O'Donovan ought to
have shifted the burden of proving independence to O'Donovan.
In this case, it might have been difficult for O'Donovan to show
independence. Even in the absence of deep ties between them,
the possibility of additional contributions from Eisner (a
possibility that does not cease merely because Eisner's son
graduated from the institution) might make O'Donovan cautious,
at the very least, about appearing to offend or oppose Eisner.
That caution suggests the possibility that, even if O'Donovan
would not consciously pander to Eisner, O'Donovan might be
willing to interpret facts in a way consistent with Eisner's
interpretation. But that willingness, of course, goes to the heart
of independence. Since the choice of interpretive methods might
be made on the basis of considerations outside of those limited to
the best interests of the corporation, that inclination (whether or
not acted upon) might be sufficient to challenge independence
(without suggesting a flaw in O'Donovan's character or motives).
On the other hand, the relationship between Eisner and
O'Donovan might be hierarchical in a classic sense. O'Donovan
owes his seat to the goodwill of Eisner and his fondness for
Georgetown, the institution O'Donovan represents. That
fondness produces donations to Georgetown. O'Donovan might
be seen as a hostage to the need of Georgetown to maintain that
fondness at appropriate levels. As such, the relationship between
Eisner and O'Donovan is not horizontal, but vertical. Vertical
relationships create a presumption of domination and shift the
burden of proving independence to O'Donovan.
406 That was one of the points of Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Del. Ch.
1985) according to Chancellor Chandler. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
731 A.2d at 359.
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9. George W. Mitchell
The subordination based relational analysis abandons the
chancery court's famous person rule of independence. It also
reduces the importance of the contextual rule of corruption-that
the stakes must be high to support a conclusion that temptation
is reasonable. Both rules provided the basis for the chancery
court's characterization of the independence of former Senator
Mitchell. 40 7  A relational analysis grounded in subordination
would frame the issue differently. Even former American
Senators have to eat. And status, like a delicate plant, requires
careful tending. Former Senator Mitchell is indeed famous, but
he earns his money the way the rest of the world does-through
income from investment and through payment for work done by
him or by companies in which he may have an interest. In this
case, Mitchell's relationship with Eisner is one of subordination
in two respects-Eisner may control his consulting arrangement
with Disney,408 and Eisner may affect the income his firm
receives from Disney.409 At a minimum, that suggests that the
burden ought to shift to Mitchell to show independence. This
may be no easy task. Consider for example the issue of
materiality. Materiality, in a relationship of subordination,
should not be measured merely by a dray quantitative
comparison of the actual funds historically at issue with the
speculated wealth of the person whose income may be affected.
In this case much more is at stake-future income on the basis of
the consulting agreement, reputation and thus desirability for
service on other boards, the nature of the relationship with the
407 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
408 The CII Amicus correctly framed the issues in this respect:
Although the Court of Chancery speculated that Mitchell would not
consider his $50,000 in consulting fees material, there is no basis for that
conclusion at this early stage of the proceedings, when Plaintiffs have been
unable to take discovery from Mitchell. Moreover, Mitchell surely has an
expectation of continuing his consulting relationship with Disney, and of
increasing the income he receives through that relationship. Thus,
Mitchell has a personal economic incentive not to defy Eisner, who has the
power as CEO to affect the future of Mitchell's consulting arrangement
with the company.
CII Amicus at 30-31.
409 Again, the CII Amicus better framed the issue: "As CEO of Disney, Eisner
has the power to replace Mitchell's firm at any time. Thus, there is at least a
reasonable doubt whether Mitchell would jeopardize his firm's continued
relationship with Disney by defying Eisner." Id. at 31.
1096 [Vo1.79:1011
2005] RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND DISNEY-OVITZ
law firm. These qualitative considerations may significantly
increase the value of even small sums of money to Senator
Mitchell in the context in which the issue arises. It is thus not at
all clear that Mitchell is independent of Eisner.
10. Irwin E. Russell
Relational analysis based on subordination analysis adds
little to the chancery court's analysis of Russell. He is virtually
the classic example of the case where domination is possible.
Russell is Eisner's agent. That agency relationship is important
to Russell. The possibility of domination is great. But Russell
should be free to attempt to overcome the presumption. That
effort, given the state of the record at the time of the litigation,
might not have been successful.
11. Sidney Poitier
Sir Poitier presents a set of issues similar to those of former
Senator Mitchell but directed to Poitier's relationship with Ovitz
rather than a relationship with Eisner. The chancery court,
applying a variant of the famous person rule of independence,
determined that Poitier had not been shown to be dominated by
Ovitz. 410 The CII Amicus concurred. 411 A subordination based
relational analysis complicates the analysis, especially when the
dynamics of race are added. The chancery court deems Poitier
independent of Ovitz because Poitier is deemed capable of
approving the Employment Agreement without bias.412 But, it is
as likely that the relationships between Poitier, Ovitz and CAA
make Poitier incapable of avoiding bias. In this case, the
question is the extent to which relational factors make it more or
less likely that Poitier would feel compelled to give his
relationship with Ovitz a significant role in the evaluation of the
Employment Agreement. It is possible to characterize the
relationship between Poitier and Ovitz as carrying significant
elements of subordination. Ovitz and CAA were instrumental in
Poitier's efforts to secure employment in films. Those efforts
continued through the time the Employment Agreement was
being considered.413 Ovitz did not leave CAA in disgrace; he
410 See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
411 CII Amicus at 32-33.
412 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 361.
413 See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
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retained significant connections with that agency. To the extent
Poitier continued to employ CAA in his creative efforts, his
relationship with Ovitz would continue to be important and yield
large effects on the quality of Poitier's relationship with CAA. It
might be reasonable to assume that Poitier did not wish to
jeopardize those relationships, or risk jeopardizing those
relationships by questioning the financial aspects of the Ovitz
transaction. As an African-American actor, those concerns, or
the significance of those risks might have appeared greater.414
Indeed, Poitier's career was so successful, in part, because of his
ability to carefully navigate the limitations of race and racialized
pictures during the 1950s and 1960s.415 The complicated webs of
414 This is reflected in some commentary about Poitier's 2002 Oscar speech. See
Inquiring Minds: Lewis Gordon On Minorities In The Film Industry, GEORGE
STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 8, 2005 (Mary Jo Curtis, Interview with Lewis Gordon),
available at http://www.brown.edu/Administration/George-StreetJournal/vol26/
26GSJ23d.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
All this is to say that the 2002 ceremony shows how long a road has been
trod. That journey was best stated in Poitier's magnificent speech. He
spoke of a community of people (from all racial backgrounds) who were
committed to making a difference through the opportunities they offered
him, and he exemplifies, with dignity and grace, what it means to rise to
such an occasion.
Id. See also Kimberley Davis, After Halle's Oscar: Why Black Actresses Still Can't
Get Any Respect in Hollywood, EBONY (MARCH, 2003), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1077/is_5_58/ai_97874213 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2005).
One longtime Hollywood agent, who asked not to be named, says Hollywood
executives don't live with and don't have significant relationships with
African-Americans, and therefore don't-or won't-give many of them a
shot. 'There are so many talented Blacks out there who will never get an
opportunity because it's a closed shop. That's the reality,' says the agent,
who has represented many Black actresses over the years. 'It's all about
revenue. If they see an opportunity to make money off of [Blacks], we're in.
Other than that, get back!'
Id.
415 Consider this description of his early career from an internet tribute page:
And he was careful to nurture his career by refusing to accept roles that
detracted from his dignity as a human being, choosing his spots carefully,
but taking advantage of the opportunities that arose beginning in the
1950s. His career grew rather slowly compared to careers of young actors
today... . Until the 60s, his major film roles revolved around his race.
Classic Movies, A Tribute to Sidney Poitier, available at
http://www.classicmovies.org/articles/aa022000a.htm ("Classic Movies is a major
destination site for fans of classic Hollywood films and old, vintage movies, with
hundreds of pages of content featuring tributes to classic movie stars, actors,
actresses, directors, filmmakers, composers, and other movie people, news about
celebrity deaths, and information about movies for sale .. ") (last visited Nov. 12,
1098
10992005] RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND DISNEY-OVITZ
relationships that contribute to a successful career, and in this
case, that focused on the ongoing relationships between Poitier,
an actor, CAA, an actor's representation business, and Ovitz, the
former head of CAA and now negotiating terms for employment
as President of Disney, among other things a studio, might make
it seem a recipe for dependencies running in all sorts of
directions. At a minimum, then, such complications might
suggest, again, that the burden shift to Poitier to demonstrate
his independence. That is possible. His age, his career plans at
the time, his stature in the film industry, and the nature of his
relationships with the other actors might indeed suggest that
Poitier could consider the terms of the Employment Agreement
apart from his relationship to Ovitz.
12. Reveta Bowers
At last we come to the inspiration for this analysis. It is
appropriate to end this Article where we started: the
independence of Reveta Bowers. This Article has suggested the
ways in which both the chancery court's analysis and CII's
alternative approach fail to engage important factual and policy
aspects of independence. A subordination based relational
approach is more sensitive to the realities of dependence and
independence in the relationship between Bowers and Eisner.
Unlike the CII approach, the focus should not be on the
mathematical relation between Bowers' director fees and other
income. 416 Unlike the chancery court approach, the focus should
not be on insulation of "regular folks" from the application of an
independence analysis417-such an approach does little to avoid
subordination and disserves the shareholders on whose behalf
the analysis is undertaken. A subordination analysis is far more
complicated. Eisner had once employed the school at which
Bowers was a principal for the education of his children. That
should constitute direct dependence. But at the time the
Employment Agreement was being considered that was no longer
the case, and it was unlikely that Eisner would produce more
children to send to the school. That militates against a
determination of direct relation. What were left were the
friendly ties resulting from that prior hire. But that friendship
2005).
416 See CII Amicus at 29-30.
417 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d at 360.
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was not between equals. Eisner's friendship could produce lots of
benefits-from further enrollment of children on Eisner's
recommendation, to donations to the school by a parent with fond
memories of the service he received, to entr6e into the social
circle frequented by Eisner to further the philanthropic and other
work of Bowers. These relational connections would be
important to Bowers-perhaps far more important than the
money represented by the director fees that made a comfortable
life somewhat more comfortable. These dependencies were
complicated by race. If Eisner served as Bowers' patron and
bridge into white philanthropic circles, the dependency deepened.
If Eisner was merely one of a number of competing entry points
into the world of white philanthropy, then the dependency
lightened considerably. All of these factors might have an
influence on Bowers' approach to the consideration of issues put
forward by Eisner. On the other hand, none of it might matter.
Bowers' race might insulate her from the pressures of performing
for Eisner as readily as it might have made performance more
important. Bowers' own social system, to the extent it did not
depend on Eisner, liberated her from worrying about the effect of
Eisner's pleasure or anger on the rest of Bowers' life. That would
leave only the directorship of Disney as the one factor that Eisner
might affect. But in Bowers' world of principle and philanthropy,
independence might be more valuable than the Disney
directorship.418 The possibility of dependence, however, would, in
Bowers' case, also shift the burden of proving independence from
plaintiffs to Bowers. The substantive question would be a very
close call on the basis of the facts available at the time of the
litigation.
What result? Applying a subordination based relational
analysis, the question of the board's independence becomes a
much closer question. It is more likely that Eisner can be found
to be interested in the transaction. It is also more likely that
perhaps a majority of the board of directors will be found to be
interested or dominated. But the standard does not guarantee a
finding of domination. It is not meant to. A closer investigation
of the relationships of board members, a tighter application of
rules of independence, can produce board actions substantially
more difficult to challenge in subsequent litigation. It may also
418 For a more detailed parsing of these factors, see supra notes 341-87.
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result in more issues having to be approved by the shareholders
where a requisite number of independent directors cannot be
found. These are both good results. A standard that deepens the
legitimacy of board of director decisions should be welcome by all
participants in the governance of corporations. A standard that
devolves more decisions affecting directors and officers to the
shareholders furthers shareholder democracy and should be
welcome by them. It also protects decisions from second-guessing
by courts, after the fact, and increases the confidence of owners.
Application of such a standard might have avoided the approval
of the Employment Agreement as ultimately signed, the
invocation of the termination provisions as ultimately approved,
or the litigation over the Employment Agreement that sapped
the resources of the corporation from 1997 through 2005. And
the price to be paid would have been small enough: ensuring
that directors actually approving the transactions could meet the
more rigorous and legitimating standards of a subordination
based relational approach to independence.
CONCLUSION
Joel Seligman has noted a relationship between the renewal
of the Ovitz litigation and the corporate scandals of 2001 that led
to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
419
Only in 2003, after Enron and an amended complaint, did the
Delaware Chancery Court revive the possibility of a trial on the
merits of what was then styled In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litigation. These decisions coincided with a dramatic increase
in the ratio of the compensation of the corporate CEO to that of
the average corporate blue collar employee. In 1980, this ratio
was 42 to 1; by 1990, it had grown to at least 120 to 1; by 2000,
it was estimated to be at least 475 to 1.420
The Ovitz litigation, however, has had little effect on the
construction of rules for the independence of directors. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 301, puts forth a definition of
independence for purposes of audit committee membership that
419 Joel Seligman, Corporate Accountability: Bolster the SEC and Litigation, 3(4)
NEW DEMOCRACY PROJECT NEWSL., Apr. 1, 2005.
420 Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 114 (2004) (citing Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for
C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 115-16, 116 n.2 (2002)).
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takes only economic relationships into account. 421  State
corporate law principles continue to exert a large influence on
this issue. To the extent it continues to mask issues of race,
gender and class, it will continue to be a troublesome source of
legal standard setting.
The temptation at this point might be to dismiss the analysis
as the failings of a single Chancellor in a single case in a matter
with respect to which the Chancellor's determination was
overturned-on other grounds-on appeal. Chancellor Chandler,
however, is not to be faulted for his analysis in Disney. I believe
that the Chancellor did an admirable job of setting out and
applying the current standards for challenging director
independence in Delaware. 422 Directors, however, tend to get lost
in the presumptions of the standard. Narrowly drawn to value
only economic and financial interactions, the standard tends to
overlook the reality of the relationships between individuals. As
the analyses put forth by both Chancellor Chandler and CII
demonstrate, standards so narrowly constructed produce more
frustration than fair results. But as Vice Chancellor Strine's
analysis in Oracle also demonstrates, unbounded relational
analyses may not be more helpful than the narrow approach of
Disney. A more nuanced approach that examines relationships
in the context of power, and specifically of the power
relationships inherent in hierarchies of race, gender, and class
offers a better chance at obtaining a fair evaluation of the total
421 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-
76. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added section 1OA(m) to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, defining "independence" as follows:
(3) Independence-
(A) In general.-Each member of the audit committee of the issuer
shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall
otherwise be independent.
(B) Criteria.-In order to be considered to be independent for purposes
of this paragraph, a member of an audit committee of an issuer may
not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit
committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee-
(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from
the issuer; or
(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
Id.
422 For an even more sophisticated application of the law of director
independence by Chancellor Chandler, see Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 26-31(Del. Ch. 2002), where the Chancellor assesses the independence of six different
directors.
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circumstances of key relationships. Both Critical Race and
Feminist Theories provide the tools as well as the normative
foundation for creating norms based upon these principles.
Fundamental to Critical Race and Feminist approaches is a
simple goal that is easy to overlook in the search for certainty in
the law: Determinations of the character of a relationship should
not depend on prejudged factors but rather ought to be based on
a realistic appraisal of the totality of the circumstances of the
relationship. For that purpose, race, gender, and class matter
just as much as direct financial or economic relationships. From
this insight, it has been possible to develop the outlines of a
subordination based relational standard and to demonstrate the
way that standard could be applied in even the more difficult
factual contexts, like those presented in the Disney litigation.
Race, class, subordination, and relational analysis should hold
few terrors for corporate governance in general and Delaware
law in particular. Both, applied reasonably, can significantly
further the great traditional goals of shareholder democracy and
governance legitimacy. The difficulties of the Disney litigation
suggested the broad outlines of the problem; the hope expressed
here is for the production of the broad outlines of a solution.
1103
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1104
